THE

MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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SIGNS OF THE TIMES

The Report of the Commission on Church Doctrine.

It must have given no small joy to the patriarch Jacob when the fourteen years' toil for his Rachel was ended. We can imagine a similar sense of relief in the minds of the members of the Doctrinal Commission when their labours of fourteen years were concluded by the publication of their Report.[1] But whether it be a Rachel or a Leah that has been secured is much discussed.

At the outset it ought to be emphasized that the Report is not written by theologians for theologians. The Commissioners write: 'our report has not been composed primarily for expert theologians' (p. 24). Neither is it written for the man in the street: that unecclesiastically-minded public which, though it might hear the Lord gladly has no interest in, nor knowledge of, theological disputations. The Commissioners assert that 'we are not writing chiefly for the general public' (p. 13).

The Report is written for those who come between both classes: educated and thoughtful practising Church people who feel they need guidance in religious matters, in view of the differences which exist among theologians and Church leaders—'that large body of persons,' described by the Archbishop of

[1] *Doctrine in the Church of England.* The report of the Commission on Christian Doctrine appointed by the Archbishops of Canterbury and York in 1922. (S.P.C.K. 2/6. 1938.)

York, who 'take a serious interest in the problems of the Christian religion.' Meanwhile the Church public is required to study the Report, and not a few seem to be so engaged. The first edition of the Report was sold out almost immediately and it is predicted that it will prove the year's best seller in the publishing world. So far it would seem the Report has been received with interest rather than with enthusiasm. It is a cautious and mediating document, as the productions of the Reports of large and responsible committees usually are. The documents emanating from such bodies have actually less quality than what could have been produced unaided by any single one of its members. What we look for in such a Report is neither originality nor audacity nor literary style. Such Reports are of value because they represent the general mind, the maximum of agreement, which the Commission is able to achieve. For every Commission that knows its business desires to avoid the publication of a Minority Report. Viewed from the Church party angle the Doctrinal Commission's Report makes considerable concessions to Modernism: or in other words, it shews itself sensitive to the influence of modern research in the spheres of science, history and Biblical criticism. It records, though in no decisive or dramatic fashion, the progress of Christian thinking. Its concessions to Modernism, when carefully scrutinized and judiciously weighed, are seen to be greater than are at first apparent. It partakes of the quality of Abelard's famous volume, *Sic et Non*,[2] which did perhaps more than any other single mediaeval composition to perplex, liberate and enlarge the minds of its readers. The demonstration that great Christian saints and Church doctors could be in disagreement in their teaching on important theological issues caused even the stiffest traditionalist readers to realize that truth was a larger and more many-sided thing than they had hitherto supposed.

In the case of the most controversial doctrinal issues the Commission does not come down as a body on one side or the other. But it indicates that there are two sides and that if they descended some would descend on one side of the fence and

[2] 'A collection of contradictory opinions from the Fathers on all the leading disputes of theology.' Art: Abelard. Hastings Dict. of religion and ethics (Vol. I, p. 17).

some on the other, and it does not presume to say which side would be the right one. Even Dr. Temple in his diplomatic Introduction, although he affirms his own personal belief in the historicity of the Virgin Birth and of the physical Resurrection of our Lord's body, yet utters no censure on those who do not regard them as historical events or as true presentations of the mode either of the Incarnation or of the Resurrection. The motto, 'In essentials unity: in non-essentials liberty: in all things charity,' reflects the spirit in which the Report has been produced. This spirit has been unjustly parodied:

> We are not divided,
> All one body we,
> Not in faith and doctrine
> But in charity.

In the great essentials of the Christian faith the Commission is united: but how few and how profound those essentials are. Modernists have long maintained in the notable words of Richard Baxter:

> 'The plague of the Church for above a thousand years has been the enlarging our Creed and making more fundamentals than God ever made.'

It is the weakness of the dogmatist as of the pietist that he yields, like the bad artist, to the temptation to over-elaborate. Petty dogmas, like petty pieties, are multiplied and become as detrimental to the influence of true and noble religion as excessive ornamentation spoils the impression which a work of art might have made by severe simplicity. Indirectly the Report lays the foundation for the creation of such a simplified Christian theology—which is not the equivalent of a reduced Christianity but of a purged Christianity—from which the dubious as well as the untrue is excluded. If the Report does not demand the removal of those things which are shaken, and that would be beyond its scope, at least it indicates to the eye of the discerning reader that there are such things in our traditional theology.

The Jewish Rabbis have a saying that the reward of a labour is a labour, and possibly the drafting of a scheme for implementing a Church policy demanded by the Church situation revealed in the Report will be a sign to the Commissioners by way of reward.

Concessions to Modernism in the Report.

Whilst, as we have indicated, the whole spirit of the Report is that of a liberal orthodoxy which adheres as closely as possible to traditionalist phrases and modes of thought, yet definite concessions are made in the Report to views which cannot be called traditionalist and represent the newer orthodoxy rather than the old. We cite the following examples.

Mode of the Incarnation.

In dealing with the doctrine of the Incarnation the Report does not insist that belief in an historic Virgin Birth is necessary for right belief in the Incarnation.

> 'Many of us hold . . . that belief in the Word made flesh is integrally bound up with belief in the Virgin Birth, and that this will increasingly be recognized.
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> 'There are, however, some among us who hold that a full belief in the historical Incarnation is more consistent with the supposition that our Lord's birth took place under the normal conditions of human generation. In their minds the notion of a Virgin Birth tends to mar the completeness of the belief that in the Incarnation God revealed Himself at every point in and through human nature.
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> 'We are agreed in recognizing that belief in our Lord's birth from a Virgin has been in the history of the Church intimately associated with its faith in the Incarnation of the Son of God. Further, we recognize that the work of scholars upon the New Testament has created a new setting of which theologians in their treatment of this article are obliged to take account. We also recognize that both the views outlined above are held by members of the Church, as of the Commission, who fully accept the reality of our Lord's Incarnation, which is the central truth of the Christian faith' (p. 82 f.).

Mode of the Resurrection.

The Report, in dealing with the bodily Resurrection of Jesus Christ and the bodily resurrection of all men in the last day permits an entirely spiritual view of these events. The Commissioners write:

> 'Belief that the dead would rise again with their bodies at the last day had established itself in Judaism, though not universally, for some two centuries before the Crucifixion. It is possible, therefore, that antecedent beliefs as to the resurrection of the dead have played some part in shaping the tradition of the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, even as that is recorded in the New Testament itself. This consideration, combined with others of a more general sort, inclines some of us to the belief that the connexion made in the New Testament between the emptiness of a tomb and the appearances of the Risen Lord belongs rather to the sphere of religious symbolism than to that of historical fact' (p. 86) . . . 'both in the Apostles' Creed and the Pauline Epistles the resurrection of the dead and the Resurrection of Christ are made

correlative the one to the other, and . . . the beliefs are connected not only by their historical origin, but also in their essential nature. They would maintain that the general freedom long claimed and used in the interpretation of the clause "the resurrection of the flesh" (*carnis resurrectionem*) cannot leave the interpretation of the other clause, "the third day he rose again from the dead,' unaffected. At the same time they would urge that belief in the General Resurrection at the last day inherited by the Church from the later Judaism, though remote and difficult for us as it stands, enshrines a belief with regard to the process of history which has been, and is, of profound importance' (p. 87).

'. . . In the judgment of the Commission, we ought to reject quite frankly the literalistic belief in a future resuscitation of the actual physical frame which is laid in the tomb' (p. 209).

Conditional Immortality.

In dealing with the doctrine of human immortality the Report states:

'As between the affirmation of the doctrine known as "*conditional immortality,*" and the assertion of the *universal* immortality of mankind, the Commission as a whole does not feel itself called upon to make a pronouncement. There is a large number of Christians for whom it is sufficient in these matters to affirm that "the gift of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord"' (p. 208).

Angels and Demons.

The Report, in dealing with the existence of Angels and Demons in the Biblical narratives, does not require all loyal Christian people to believe in the existence of such beings, but allows them to possess an open mind or a suspended judgment.

'To believe positively, whether on the ground of Scripture, or on the ground of tradition as interpreting Scripture and as lending weight to an inherent probability, in the existence of spiritual beings other than human is in no way irrational.

'Nevertheless, the Commission desires to record its conviction that it is legitimate for a Christian either to suspend judgment on the point, or alternatively to interpret the language, whether of Scripture or of the Church's Liturgy, with regard to angels and demons in a purely symbolical sense' (p. 47).

Miracles and their Evidential Value.

The Commissioners, loyal to the most primitive teaching of our Lord recorded in the Gospels, reject the evidential value of miracles for the attestation of moral and spiritual truth.

'It is felt by many that miracle has a special value, in that it is a striking demonstration of the subordination of the natural order to spiritual ends, and affords particular points at which God's activity is manifested with special clarity and directness. On the other hand, it is to be recognized that many others feel it to be more congruous

with the wisdom and majesty of God that the regularities, such as men of science observe in nature and call Laws of Nature, should serve His purpose without any need for exceptions on the physical plane. It is important to notice that the motives leading to this view are not exclusively scientific, but that a religious interest also is involved.

'It has to be recognized that legends involving abnormal events have tended to grow very easily in regard to great religious leaders, and that in consequence it is impossible in the present state of knowledge to make the same evidential use of the narratives of miracles in the Gospels which appeared possible in the past. This is a religious gain, inasmuch as the use of miracles to force belief appears to have been deliberately rejected by our Lord' (p. 51).

All dogmatic formulae are open to revision.

The Commissioners write:

'It must be recognized that changes in forms of thought and the progress of knowledge may necessitate changes in the intellectual formulation of the content of Revelation, though this does not mean that there is any change in that which has been revealed. The apprehension of Revelation by the human mind must needs find expression in the form of propositions, but no such formulations are to be regarded as being, in principle, irreformable. It may be that there are theological propositions accepted in the Church which will always be found neither to need nor to be capable of revision, and in that sense may be "final"; if so, they are final not in the sense that they are exempt from examination, but in the sense that examination invariably leads to their re-affirmation' (p. 79 f.).

Such concessions as these must not be taken to mean that Modernists may now sing *Nunc Dimitis* and depart in peace. The Report gives them much to be thankful for, but the task of the Modernist is far from being accomplished. There is urgent need for the composition and authorization of alternative dogmatic formularies, if the old dogmatic formularies may not be revised nor their use suspended. There is also need for a great deal of modern Christian education. Traditionalism is being overwhelmed by Secularism, and the only effective defence of the Christian religion to-day in the modern world is the Modernist presentation of Christian faith and Christian duty. There can be no more fatal error for Modernists than to relax their efforts and ride off the field before complete victory is achieved. The interests of all mankind demand that Christian Modernism should become universal, and when that is realized it is evident how enormous is the task which lies ahead. Nevertheless, we may thank God and take courage.

1662 AND TO-DAY.

A document[1] of unusual quality and importance (together with two others[2] to which we shall call attention in a subsequent issue) has been put forth by a joint committee of representative English Churchmen and Free Churchmen as the result of Conferences extending over several years. There has been a feeling for some years past that Reunion in England between the Reformed Churches has been hung up by our ecclesiastical authorities, and that the situation in that respect was much less favourable to-day that in 1920. This lately issued document, entitled 1662 *and To-day* and accepted by leading representatives of all Reformed Churches in England, gives ground for hope that once again Reunion is in sight. Reviewing the causes of our 'Unhappy Divisions,' the joint Conference remarks that

> 'Much water has flowed under the bridges since these divisions in the Church took place. Anglicans and Nonconformists *have all alike been affected by many different kinds of experience through which they have passed since* 1662.
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> 'The advance of natural science, the expansion of knowledge, the fuller recognition of the incompleteness of human knowledge, weariness of ecclesiastical controversy and the emergence of the spirit of toleration have done much to soften asperities, increase understanding, and open up new lines of thought.
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> 'The idea of Evolution, the growth of the historic sense, the comparative study of religion, the higher criticism of the Bible, and modified views of the nature of its authority, have had similar effects. Still more, a quickened sense of the duty of social service and the development of missionary enterprise have brought home to many Anglicans and Nonconformists the waste and evil of separation, and have revealed in clearer light the need and possibility of closer co-operation. The rise of militant secularism, challenging the very existence of the Church, almost compels its members towards Reunion' (p. 6*f.*).

The joint Conference is of opinion, and rightly, that the modern policy by which Free Churchmen have been liberated from political and educational disabilities — especially in the Universities — has done much to bring Anglicans and Free Churchmen closer together. It is thought that the way in which Anglicanism has developed outside England has helped to make

[1] *1662 and To-day.* (S.C.M. Price 2d. 1938.)

[2] *Outline of a Reunion Scheme for the Church of England and the Evangelical Free Churches of England.* (S.C.M. 6d. 1938.)

The Practice of Inter-Communion and the Doctrine of the Church. (S.C.M. 2d. 1938.)

clear what is essential and what is non-essential in it. We are inclined to think this point is exaggerated. The growing strength of Liberalism, within the Church of England itself, has we believe done far more than the activities and developments of Anglicanism abroad to indicate the permanent values conserved in English Churchmanship, and those features of it which are neither essential nor permanent nor attractive. The joint Conference stands on unassailable ground when it asserts :

> '. . . Since 1662 Anglicans and Nonconformists alike *have been learning to see truth in both sides of old controversies, and have, in fact, mutually influenced one another.* Anglicans have come to admit among themselves claims which they once rejected when urged by Nonconformists; and Free Churchmen also have come to see that in the stress of pressing some claims they have underestimated the force of others.'

The following citations will indicate not only the spirit of the joint Conference report, but also the way old antagonisms are being exchanged for new alliances.

The Church.

'Free Churchmen, while still emphasizing the need for the "gathered" Church of fully committed Christian disciples, are coming to understand and appreciate more than they did the value of such a corporate recognition by the nation of Christianity as being in a true sense the National Religion.'

Episcopacy.

'To many Free Churchmen Bishop still connotes "Prelate," pride of place, and the use of autocratic methods. But, manifestly, Bishops in the Church of England, not only of necessity, but of choice, have long since ceased to try to lord it over their flocks and act with increasing regard to the mind of the Church as a whole . . . There is no disposition among Free Churchmen to accept theories of Apostolic Succession, but, both among Anglicans and Free Churchmen, the way has been prepared for agreement in appreciating the place and value of a "constitutional and representative" Episcopate.'

Church Government.

'While Baptists and Congregationalists have been moving away from their old independency towards a more connexional

system of government, the Church of England has been giving a greater place in its councils to the laity and a greater measure of autonomy to the local congregation.'

Church and State.

'The Church can acknowledge responsibility for the whole population, and the State can recognize the Church as in some sense its soul, without any need for Erastianism. It is becoming clearer that the State *control* of religion is not necessarily involved in the State *recognition* of religion. From both sides of the old Disestablishment controversy many are moving towards some such solution as has been recently found by the Church of Scotland.'

Worship.

'To-day there is a growing tendency in the Free Churches in England and elsewhere to prove their freedom by drawing upon the wealth of the liturgical tradition of the Church. At the same time there is a tendency in some quarters in Anglicanism towards greater elasticity in forms of worship. Few will be found to favour the imposition of one uniform scheme of worship upon all. If the Church of England had been as comprehensive in belief and ritual in 1662 as it is to-day, the great ejection of many of its ablest and most devoted sons might not have been necessary.'

Scholarship.

'There is less tendency to inquire into the denominational connexions of a theologian or Biblical scholar. The Churches share each other's books. Any differences there are in theology and Biblical criticism cut right across all ecclesiastical boundaries.'

Toleration.

'. . . toleration at its best is an indispensable condition of arriving at the fulness of the truth.'

THE IDEALS OF OUR PEDAGOGUES

By the Rev. J. C. Hardwick, M.A., B.Sc.

TWO very interesting volumes, recently published, give frank expression to the views on education of twelve headmasters and a like number of headmistresses of leading English and Scottish schools.[1] The essays of which the books are comprised treat general ideas and ideals, as well as practical and immediate problems of policy. They display a surprising degree of unanimity, and constitute a most valuable expression of expert opinion upon what is perhaps the most important of all topics—the education of the young. As one would expect, there is a remarkable absence of crankiness and high-flying theorizing. One of the headmistresses reminds us that education is nine parts practice and one part theory, and the writers in these volumes are engaged in doing the job and not in talking about it.

It will surprise no sensible person to discover that the headmistresses are every whit as practical as the headmasters, though generally less conservative in their outlook—which is natural, for girls' schools are newer institutions than are boys' schools and consequently less hide-bound and restricted by venerable conventions. On the important subject of religion, which is dealt with at greater or lesser length by all the contributors, it is a headmistress, Miss M. G. Clarke, of the Manchester High School, who seems to us to hit the nail on the head more effectively than anyone else, and we shall make no excuse for quoting her at length.

> 'The Scripture lesson, if properly handled, is the most valuable in the week, especially for girls of fifteen and above; for a reasonable religion is the surest basis for character, conduct and citizenship. Young people have naturally a deep religious sense; but they have also a quick perception of reality and go for the essentials. For example, once they have understood the sin which our Lord found in the Pharisees, they will apply the knowledge to modern conditions and will be quick to detect the exaltation of form at the expense of spirit involved in the rehearsal of religious ceremonies, whether of weddings or of greater occasions. Religion must not only be real, but it must be real

[1] *The Headmaster Speaks* and *The Headmistress Speaks*. (Kegan Paul. 7/6 net each; 1937.)

to them, if they are to accept it. It has to be borne in mind by those who are puzzled by the falling away of young people from Church membership, that the whole educational process has been revolutionized in a generation by the substitution of experimental and heuristic methods for the older methods of authority. Young people are systematically taught to make a distinction between what they think and what they feel and to take on trust nothing that they have the chance of experiencing and proving for themselves; to expect them, at the outset of their spiritual development, to do the opposite in religion is to put the cart before the horse. The best of them will face the challenge of Jesus to Christian living and will accept it with its paradox and its mystery: but none will accept any doctrine or dogma about Him at second hand. They have the highest authority for refusing to do so: 'Flesh and blood have not revealed it unto thee, but my Father which is in heaven.' They also argue that, if Christianity is the vital force that gives life meaning and joy, organized religion should not be as dull as they often find it to be, but should be attractive; and they are quite right. Thoughtful girls, too, resent the un-Christian discrimination against women in many Christian Churches, with its accompanying implication of greater sanctity attached to the male sex. The Church as an institution seems to be faced to-day with the choice between grieving the old and alienating the young; and, if religious bodies are in earnest about the necessity of a living and united Church, they will refrain from even the desire to inculcate denominational doctrines in young people and will concentrate steadily and persistently on those truths on which Christians can agree. They would then perhaps bring about a religious revival much sooner than at present seems probable or indeed possible.'

A somewhat different view from this is taken by Mr. M. L. Jacks, of Mill Hill School, who holds that modern youth is not averse to authority.

'There is abundant evidence that with all their restlessness they are ready to accept an authority at the centre: they are indeed in search of a dictator. It is significant that all the authoritarian movements of to-day draw their recruits mainly from the young, and each such movement has its dictator for whom it is welcomed: there is Fascism in Italy and Nazi-ism in Germany with the dictatorship of a man, Communism in Russia with the dictatorship of a State, Roman Catholicism with the dictatorship of a Church, Fundamentalism with the dictatorship of a book, the Group Movement with the dictatorship of the Guiding Spirit.'

Mr. Jacks is by no means at ease in the face of this phenomenon, as he considers all these dictatorships inadequate. But there are some among those writing in this volume, who are definitely in favour of an authoritarian standpoint where religious beliefs are concerned. It is not only the Rev. V. P. Nevill, Headmaster of Ampleforth, who writes in this strain (his contribution, by the by, is marked by the wise sanity and breadth of view characteristic of the Benedictines, who deservedly are out-

stripping the Jesuits as guides of educated youth, as well as of cultured English Roman Catholics generally). The Headmaster of Glasgow Academy, Mr. F. Roydon Richards, seems to think we have seen about enough of 'rambling rationalism.' He holds that the resolution of the conflict between religion and science has encouraged Reason to banish Revelation from the sphere of religion, which in his view would leave religion devitalized.

> 'Reason will no longer be subjugated to authority. This emancipation may well be partly responsible for the substitution for religion of the widespread search for it. This standpoint is meritorious as compared with indifference, than which it is probably more common. To search for religion is not to be religious. The characteristic outlook of to-day is one of suspended judgment. This is the symptom of the new conflict, that which the new freedom of thought has engendered between reason and revelation as modes of spiritual knowledge. It is this conflict which produces many of the current attitudes: the focussing of the attention upon the vagaries of other minds as a substitute for making up one's own; the indiscriminate mistrust of creed and dogma; the denial of the validity of mystic experiences and the distaste for the sacramental; the tendency to hope for anchorage in the acceptance of Christian ethics plus a vague pantheism . . . The further this individualism is pushed, the more anaemic religion becomes as a moral and social force. Society cannot recover from such devitalization until the pulse of religion beats more strongly, and that will not be till reason in the generality of men is prepared to come to terms with revelation. A better world will not be built upon a new faith dictated by reason, but upon a restored faith in revelation made intelligible by reason.
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> 'To restore faith in revelation and to make revelation intelligible through reason ought to be an avowed aim of the schools if education is not to shirk the gravest of its responsibilities. Whatever else that means, it at least means teaching the Bible with insistence on the holiness and worshipfulness of God and insistence that Jesus Christ was what He claimed to be.'

This is a highly important observation. What is really needed to-day is a clear and coherent theory of *how we attain religious truth* (a new religious epistemology). But this can best be worked out not along the old lines of an antithesis between reason and revelation, but along new lines parallel with those followed by searchers for a theory of *how we attain aesthetic truth* (an aesthetic epistemology). Religious and aesthetic knowledge, though rational in the sense that both can be justified at the bar of reason, cannot be attained solely by the exercise of reason. But the processes by which we attain knowledge in the twin spheres of religion and art are *natural*, even though they may be other than merely rational. The true antithesis is not between natural reason and supernatural revelation, but between reason and some

other faculty or group of faculties which are no more and no less supernatural than reason itself — though they may go deeper than reason does.

Mr. Roydon Richards' last sentence in the passage quoted indicates that his solution is no solution. We must insist, he says, that Jesus Christ 'was what He claimed to be.' But what Jesus did actually claim to be is just one of those historical problems upon which scholars do not as yet agree. Even Bishop Gore admitted that Jesus did not claim to be God — if that is what Mr. Richards is driving at.

We are of opinion that Mr. J. E. Barton, Headmaster of Bristol Grammar School, has a better grasp of the actual situation. He realizes that people are searching to-day, not because it is more blessed to seek than to find, but because what their fathers believed is no longer credible — owing chiefly to the advance of historical research. This may be deplorable, and we may close our eyes to it, and insist that a building standing on undermined ground is still habitable, but such a policy will not save us.

> 'We are emerging,' writes Mr. Barton, 'from a long period of social disintegration, which has seen the crumbling of many creeds, and the break-up of those certitudes which held together the older and aristocratic type of civilization. The highest aim of any school in these days is to contribute something towards a new social unity, built up on foundations preserved from the old verities which underlie all morals and all religion, but extended to support the growing aspirations of an immeasurably larger and more various community.'

But happily in the midst of our uncertainties, the necessities of life press upon us — that is the one thing certain. Educators must equip the young to meet the strains and demands of life, and we may note that there is one thing upon which *all* of them agree — the need for hard work; education means a solid grind for the learner, and there is no getting out of it merely by making things 'interesting.' The one good thing that these schoolmasters and schoolmistresses have to say about examinations (which do appear to lie as a kind of blight upon our schools) is that they induce even the lazy and indifferent boy to do a certain amount of work.

> 'The picture drawn,' writes Mr. N. Whatley, Headmaster of Clifton, 'of an examination-less school, in which masters, untrammelled by syllabuses and careless of results, are a perpetual source of inspiration, and boys, even on hot summer afternoons, are full of desire for know-

ledge for its own sake, is not true to nature. The development of examinations of the School Certificate type has even had the positive advantage that they compel a master to think of the boy at the bottom of the form as well of the boy at the top.'

Furthermore, even liberty, that much-trumpeted blessing, costs something. After all, freedom of thought depends on the capacity to think — which is not so very common. As Mr. Barton says :

'Essential liberty in things of the mind and taste can only be won through stubborn effort in resisting our animal weakness for taking the easy line and going nowhere in particular. Hard work is never a pleasure to begin with: but even in youth it is possible to discover a secret satisfaction in overcoming difficulties. All education must have its core of deliberate striving with reluctant matter, and with the promptings of native indolence.'

One could wish that some of the headmasters had had more to say about the virtues of co-operative work in schools—as distinct from common cribbing and copying. In schools a great deal of co-operative work goes on in the fields of music and drama. Many schools have highly efficient orchestras, choirs, and dramatic societies, and the value of the work done by such organizations can scarcely be exaggerated, both as a civilizing and moralizing agency. One is tempted to believe that in these days a good music master (and the old type of music master is fortunately extinct) can do more for the boys in a school than the chaplain himself. He helps them to develop within themselves those two most valuable of the instincts—the co-operative and the creative. One wonders whether the possibilities of co-operative work in science, especially chemistry and physics, are being fully exploited in our schools. To put a group of boys on to a piece of research or analysis would prove a valuable experiment, and doubtless it is often done in school laboratories, but no mention is made of it here. It is indeed a pity that none (so far as one can make out) of the contributors to these volumes is a science teacher. Perhaps such do not commend themselves to governing bodies as headmasters.

One of the headmistresses to be sure has some most valuable observations to make on this subject of co-operation, which is bound to come to the front more and more in the future, now that competitive individualism is giving way everywhere to team work.

Miss E. R. Gwatkin, Headmistress of Streatham Hill High School, after saying that the first principle of discipline is 'the acquisition of the power of making a prolonged effort,' and 'the idea that anything undertaken should be carried through,' goes on to insist that 'the second constituent of discipline is the widening of the individual view, so that the child learns to take into account the effect upon other people of her actions.'

> 'True understanding of others must lead to co-operation, and where co-operation is the end, competition has no place. It need do no harm to a girl to measure herself against others . . . but the girl who works hard in order that she may excel others may gain more knowledge indeed, but at the expense of detriment to character. It is true that the society of the adult world is organized largely on a competitive basis, but that should not deter those who believe in co-operation from doing all they can to ensure that the rising generation should look to the same ideal.'

It is possible that Miss Gwatkin is putting the cart before the horse. In dealing with the young practice should precede principles. To talk about co-operation is useless; but to put children to work together on a task, and to see that they do it together, is to make them act co-operatively. Hence the value of choirs, play-acting, laboratory work and games. Co-operation leads to understanding of others, not *vice versa*. We can only learn to understand others by working with them. The melancholy truth is that ninety-nine per cent. of our moral exhortation of the young is useless if not deleterious. The line to follow is to encourage certain instincts by giving them scope for action, and to discourage others simply by crowding them out. No talk, no preaching, is necessary. We adults must curb our exhibitionist tendencies in the presence of the young.

And how wise are the following words of Miss Gwatkin, and how much pulpit clap-trap do they render obsolete!

> 'We have ceased to regard the conscientiously self-sacrificing person as the highest kind of saint, recognizing both the evil effect he may have upon persons who accept his sacrifices and the pharisaical pleasure he often derives from his planned well-doing. A good co-operator is a better person than one who believes it his mission in life to devote himself to the service of others.'

Another Headmistress, Miss Muriel Davies, of Streatham Secondary School, also insists upon the vital importance of encouraging co-operative action in schools, and declares, quite rightly, that this field 'has not yet been nearly fully explored.'

Miss Clarke, of Manchester High School, has some interesting remarks to make about co-education :

> 'In theory co-education seems to have everything in its favour; men and women have to live and work together in the world, what better preparation than to grow up together? But in practice things do not work out in that way. In Scotland, where co-education is the rule and single-sex schools the exception, women as independent human beings are at a disadvantage, socially and economically, in adult life. . . . Moreover, under present conditions, so-called "co-education" is as a rule education for boys of which girls are permitted — or forced — to partake. This probably does little harm up to the age of eleven; but between the approximate limits of eleven and seventeen years of age the adolescent boy and girl develop at different ages and at different rates, not only physically, but mentally and emotionally. . . . There does seem to exist in both sexes at adolescence a natural tendency towards segregation in pursuit of their more important activities, and this tendency has behind it a long tradition, whose roots extend back into primitive human society. In the interests of social training it is certainly most desirable that boys and girls should enjoy one another's companionship and should combine in some of their spare-time pursuits. But, if all the facts are taken into account, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, as a national method of secondary education, the single-sex is definitely to be preferred to the mixed school.'

Miss Clarke adds, however, that the absence of men teachers from girls' schools 'is much to be regretted from every point of view.' She holds that 'from about the age of fourteen girls normally stand to profit from the teaching of men, which provides an intellectual stimulus subtly different from that of the teaching of most women, and which has a bracing effect on girls at that stage.' Miss Clarke also is in favour of the married woman teacher, 'than whom, other things being equal, there is no better teacher or trainer.'

> 'A fuller and often more satisfying experience of life than that of the unmarried woman, makes her of immense value, when this experience is allied with intellectual ability and teaching power. It is quite wrong that the economic considerations which at present exclude married women teachers under so many public authorities (London and Manchester are honourable exceptions) should be regarded as more important than the claims of an enlightened educational policy in such a vital matter as this.'

Though the question of school discipline does occur in these volumes, little space is allotted to it, as perhaps it is taken for granted. The only mention of corporal punishment that we have noticed occurs in the essay of Mr. A. H. Ashcroft, Headmaster of Fettes, who is in favour of it.

> 'My own considered opinion is,' he writes, 'that corporal punishment has still its rightful place in the well-disciplined school. It is

expeditious, and nearly always efficacious: the relationship between master and boy is now so intimate and friendly that the use of the cane creates no bad blood between them. The stale saying that caning hurts the master more than the boy is not ironical but true; and, more important still, the average boy himself realizes that it is true. . . . I doubt if many boys would ever have challenged its salutary rightfulness, if it had not been suggested to them by older people that they find something repugnant in it.'

The silence of other headmasters upon this topic must be attributed by the reader, either to their taking such punishment for granted (which seems on the whole unlikely), or to their not considering the matter worth discussion. Certainly the need for corporal punishment where it exists would seem to indicate a certain failure on the part of the educator in the very difficult task he has to perform. Perhaps the suggestion of Mr. H. P. N. Sloman, Headmaster of Tonbridge, is more in keeping with recent opinion, where really troublesome boys (a very small minority) are concerned:

'It seems certain that, in the course of the next generation, universal advantage will be taken, in normal as well as abnormal cases, of the advice of the psychologist, who will take his rightful and necessary place along with the school Medical Officer as an essential servant in every school. . . . If parents and schoolmasters and psychologists would co-operate more closely and discuss their problems more frequently and at an earlier date, fewer boys of sixteen, or even eighteen, would be ignorant of what they wanted to do in life, or, what is worse, be committed to a course of training leading to an avocation, to which they are entirely unsuited.'

But it is to be feared that few parents desire to know the real truth about their own offspring, and few headmasters as things are have the courage to tell them. The successful schoolmaster too often has to be a kind of Soapy Sam to speak smooth things that fathers believe and mothers like to hear.

Though the word 'emotion' is distasteful to an Englishman, there can be no doubt that it is with the training of the emotions that the future of civilization lies. There is something in Mr. Aldous Huxley's contention that in many moderns a tolerable intelligence is united to the emotions of a moron. To educate the emotions is not a luxury but a necessity if another dark age is not to engulf us and our culture.

'Really and by nature every man's a unity; but you've artificially transformed the unity into a trinity. One clever man and two idiots—that's what you've made of yourself. An admirable manipulation of ideas, linked with a person who, so far as self-knowledge and feeling are concerned, is just a moron; and the pair of you associated with a

half-witted body. A body that's hopelessly unaware of all that it does and feels, that has no accomplishments, that doesn't know how to use itself or anything else. Two imbeciles and one intellectual. But man is a democracy where the majority rules. You've got to do something about that majority.' [2]

These schoolmasters do not really tell us nearly as much as they ought as to how to go to work to educate this majority. They still cling far too much to the notion that it can be done by imposing beliefs upon the young. But what are imposed beliefs worth? Perhaps the importance of all beliefs has been exaggerated! We have lived on beliefs for two thousand years, and the amount of blood and tears seems not appreciably to diminish. Why not try to tackle the root of the trouble—the emotions? As it is we ignore them, suppress them, or do our best to render them inarticulate. Miss D. F. P. Hiley, Headmistress of the Central Newcastle High School, knows better, and perhaps our women teachers will succeed where their male opposite numbers have failed—or not been at the trouble to try.

'Our emotions are there,' she writes, 'much more fundamentally and ineradicably than our brains, and it is dangerous to leave them untutored, neglected and savage. It is in this connection that music, art, literature and dramatic training have such a pre-eminently important part to play, but each subject has its appropriate emotional exercise.'

And so far as the third member of the trinity—the body, is concerned, is it not too much taken for granted that games and physical training accomplish all that is necessary? But is there not a need to train the *senses*—to enable the young to hear and see? What is the good of a beefy body if it is 'hopelessly unaware of all that it does and feels?' It is the arts like music and painting that develop hearing and sight. We want discrimination and sensitiveness. It is for this reason that we may welcome as the most hopeful feature of the Headmasters' book, that all seem to recognize the value of these pursuits, and all testify to the progress made in recent years. That the headmistresses tell the same tale goes without saying, for their attitude throughout is eminently hospitable to new ideas.

But these two volumes make very encouraging reading. One feels that if the future of our country lay with our schoolmasters and schoolmistresses, it would be far safer than the most optimistic of us can consider it to be at present.

[2] *Eyeless in Gaza*, p. 14.

ECONOMIC MEASURES AND THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY*

By I. M. Horobin, Warden of Mansfield House University Settlement.

FOR rather more than a hundred years, from the last of the eighteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth, it was possible, and common, to base one's social policy and private ethics on the proposition that there was an inherent harmony in the economic sphere between the results of enlightened individual self-interest and the welfare of the whole community and all its parts. It was possible to hold, further, that any interference with the workings of these individual forces of self-interest would in the long run do more harm than good. This, the doctrine of 'laissez-faire, laissez-aller,' was what the Economists were supposed to have proved, though as a matter of fact they had neither proved it nor had most of them even asserted it without various qualifications. So long as this doctrine was reasonably held, the duty of the Church was clear: to keep out of business and of politics, except in so far as (and it is a long way) the moral implications in the phrase 'enlightened' self-interest required their witness in all ranks of society.

But in fact the economists had clearly observed, and the patent facts of the industrial revolution soon emphasized, that matters were not quite so simple. Also we must not be misled by the extravagances of the present age in the opposite direction, nor by the fundamental soundness and subtlety of the broad principles of the classical economists from Adam Smith to Mill and Ricardo, from recalling how important those qualifications were. I will refer only to three typical points in passing. Any measure which raises wages, and at the same time leads to an equivalent improvement in the efficiency of the worker, or rectifies an unduly low wage due to fear or ignorance, is an unmixed social and economic good. And there are such measures. Correspondingly, it is palpable that if once effective demand for

* An address delivered to theological students.

any reason gets into evil hands — *e.g.* a bad man's lucky gamble — then the resources of the country will be for some time diverted to the satisfaction of bad or comparatively unimportant wants, before much more urgent and legitimate wants are satisfied, and it is sometimes possible and desirable for the State to avoid or rectify this. Lastly, and most important, there are any number of goods and evils (to use a crude phrase) which are not economic goods and evils at all — I shall have something to say about these later. I will only at this stage point out that whole branches of 'Social Reform' (not all desirable) come under this head, *e.g.* temperance legislation, or again, compulsory education.

Once these theoretical and practical problems are posed, the whole attitude of the Church to man as citizen has to be reconsidered. It becomes necessary once again to adjust the claims of competing good ideals, rediscovered, alas! to be to some extent mutually incompatible in this imperfect world.

In particular we must reconsider the vitally important issue of reconciling, as far as may be, social justice with individual liberty. At the present moment we are probably at the very nadir of the world's respect for liberty. But surely only a Church bent on suicide would cease to place the freedom of the will and the responsibility of the individual in the very forefront of its teaching. That very belief, therefore, in the importance of economic matters in life, which drives so many Churchmen to urgent thought upon the economic *results* of society, should make especially urgent for them the problem of economic *motives* in society, and the influence of its structure as a field for the development and exercise of the wills of its citizens. Can we believe that any 'authoritarian state,' any society so planned and controlled at every point as so many are becoming here and abroad, could ever secure the full approval of the Church: even if that society were found to distribute more justly such material goods as its industry produced?

If, however, we have to reconcile these difficult and partly irreconcilable claims, it is important not to add to our difficulties, as is frequently done in one or other of two ways. First, do not exaggerate the evils of the present position. Many people — perhaps from an uneasy conscience that they have never done,

nor are now doing, anything very effective to tackle any one specific social problem — make the most preposterously exaggerated and unfair statements about the condition of the people of this country and their prospects. I need not say very much on this matter now, as you have had many opportunities in lecture and visit to get some information about the vast machinery of social protection which exists in the country, and the vast strides that have long been taking place in the country's well-being. Secondly, do not let us fall into the error against which the Church had to be warned by its Founder almost as soon as it was formed: you and all of us must expect to be pestered with every kind of crank and quack and false prophet, each quite sure that it is all perfectly easy; the millenium is to be had for the asking if only you study the Great Pyramid or shoot Mr. Montague Norman, or sign the enclosed resolution and send it to your local Member of Parliament. Run not hither and thither after them! And as for the common assumption behind so many of them, remember that if the test you must constantly apply to any proposal is mainly its effect on the individual will — you may be sure that as your business is, so will your politics be. Merely to call the same sort of man — often actually the same man — permanent secretary of a Government department instead of chairman of a board of directors will not of itself make the kind of difference that you are seeking. Surely the last few years point clearly a moral which is no more popular to-day than it was when the Church first started preaching it: short cuts and material devices are mischancy things. Those who build new worlds 'safe for democracy,' and 'happier countries for all.' secular paradises built on a foundation of flattering unregenerate human nature, have reaped the reward promised to those who built on sand. Those who have idealised the 'people' have been followers of Rousseau and the eighteenth century deists, not the great teachers of the Church, who had far too clear a knowledge of our real make-up as individuals to sentimentalize about us when we got into crowds. Remember that it may be perfectly good democracy when we are only all voting in favour of the same sins.

At this point I would draw your attention to a proposition whose truth and importance is only equalled by its neglect by

most well-meaning academic reformers. It has been shown conclusively by both theoretical economics and practical experience on both sides of the Atlantic in the last thirty years, and especially recently, that there is one kind of deliberate action on the part of society, acting on ethical grounds, which gives, broadly speaking, the desired results, while there is another kind of action which inevitably leads further and further into an inextricable tangle of state regulations, absolutely destructive of both liberty and progress.

Broadly speaking, society can (and, most of us think, should) modify within quite wide limits the conditions under which economic forces and individual decision take effect. Few people would now deny that the strict control exercised over conditions of employment by the Factory Acts, for example, does far more good than harm. And though our unemployment insurance system, to take another example, has undoubtedly increased unemployment, encouraged casual labour, on occasion led to widespread abuse of public money, and remains a serious danger to the integrity of our political institutions, nevertheless, when all is said, few will deny that its benefits enormously outweigh its defects, and its absence would lead to almost unimaginable sufferings.

But there is another type of State action which is not directed to adjusting the conditions of private *action*, but endeavours by law to decree that certain economic *results* shall take place. All such measures, whether they be called Socialism, economic planning, price fixing, quota regulations, etc., have this in common: that, like Canute, they do not modify the motive power, they endeavour to decide the result. Such and such shall be the output of coal; such and such shall be the price of pepper; such and such shall be the persons entitled to grow hops; such and such shall be the kind of employment allowed to certain people.

Speaking both as a politician and as an economist, I cannot too strongly commend to your consideration that the liberty of the individual, either as a consumer of economic wealth or as agent in economic production, is incompatible with such a conception of State action. If you agree with me that no society can possibly be acceptable to the Church in which economic problems of consumption and production remain of the utmost

importance, but become matters in which the individual has neither freedom nor responsibility, then you will, I think, further conclude that the State must reconcile its urgent search for improved distribution of the results of its industry with an equally urgent attention to the results of the State's economic structure on the *actions* of its citizens.

I would speak with hesitation upon so difficult a matter, but there appears to me to be a vital distinction between two contemporary views of the State. The first descends from Hegel and is to be observed in action over a large part of Europe today. It believes the State to be an organism, but limits its scheme of values to the history of that organism in this world. The State is immortal perhaps, but transcends all the values, rights and duties of the individual. The other view may well draw its inspiration from the Epistle to the Romans; it believes indeed that human society is in some sense a body of interdependent, interacting members. But those members are logically and spiritually prior to it, and will survive it, passing from one society to another far better, for whose ultimate enjoyment all their actions here are but preparation. By the ultimate results upon themselves and each other their economic activities and their earthly society must always be judged. May I apply this conception immediately to make a distinction which I submit to your earnest consideration. There is no subject more liable to confuse and perplex you in these matters than the rôle of money in society. I do not propose to discuss any technicalities with you — I hold strongly, indeed, that it is not helpful to scratch the surface of so vast a subject in a few weeks' study — but, as I have said, there is a prior distinction to be made on the point which I think may be helpful to you.

Do not allow yourselves to be confused between the function of money as a measure, and the use of money as a motive. I believe that both theory and experience are conclusive that in any society in which economic welfare and liberty are both counted important, the first is *vital*. The second is, even within limits, never more than allowable, and is always dangerous. The whole structure of free society is permeated with money. Money buys everything—goods, services, rights; it measures and directs saving, investment, the means to be adopted to achieve our ends

and the choice of ends. Without it, without the free market for labour, capital, and land, no economically efficient, no individually acceptable society, is really conceivable. For support of this view I can only refer to the strange and terrible results which arise as soon as anyone is honest enough to work out the real implication of authoritarian economics, whether so far in theory in England, or already in practice abroad.

There is another warning, of less importance in economics but of special cogency perhaps to you. The 'State' is only one institution among many, and is neither at the beginning nor at the end of the hierarchy *i.e.* of corporations. This is so whether we classify logically or historically, and whether we consider, for example, its relations with the family or with such powers as (shall we say?) International Finance, or the Roman Catholic Church. But what I particularly have in mind at the moment is that, being an institution like other institutions, we can avoid idolatry and check false expectations by recalling how limited, though real, are the influences on human beings exerted by even the best-intentioned and most efficient institutions. The bonds linking one man with another are, at the closest, only gossamer compared with the inner development of heredity and spiritual growth linking one day with another within every individual. And, as a corollary, when we keep our eyes fixed closely on the living individual, as you at least must always do, how difficult we discover it to be to ensure that any action by you, or your Church, or your State, will have the expected and desired result on him. How difficult it is to do good to anyone when you know him well enough to know what you are doing, or care enough! If that be so, it is perhaps as well to remind yourself frequently to keep your legislative itch within bounds. This has a much wider application than the mere anxiety (very justifiable though that be) to avoid the 'pauperisation' of the individual and the Poplarisation of the community.

Now, before I conclude, I wish to return for a minute or two to expand a little the positive view of the State which I indicated just now — and in the light of contemporary experience in Europe. It is hopeless to oppose altogether, even if we would, the modern tendency to extend the powers of the State and exalt it with all the emotional resources of loyalty and national

patriotism. Indeed, the huge millions of the modern social units obviously cannot remain a mob—people simply will not tolerate the breakdown of society which has appeared in those countries where the bonds of unity were relaxed overmuch, or strained too far. May I hazard the suggestion that if the modern State is not to be an army, it must in some sense at least be a Church? That is, an expression of, a witness to, a vehicle for, ideals outside itself, and preparing its members for ends to be achieved elsewhere.

Once again your economic message is to the individual; and the State, and all other institutions, are in themselves of little importance to you, and indeed should have less importance to any of us. I will only add in passing that to whomsoever you think your message may be directed, at least be sure that you *have* a message! Economics and industry are exact and concrete things. If you desire to influence men's actions in those spheres you have just as much to learn as you have in the domain of ethics and philosophy and theology—it is not an easier thing to give your advice to men in business hours than out of them.

I will draw here two conclusions, with which you may not agree, but which seem to me to follow from the line of thought I have been developing. First, I see no field for the learning and exercise of responsibility, and no protection for the rights and individuality of the citizen against the pressure of the lowest common denominator of the majority, without the preservation of private property, not only in the private possessions of the individuals, but in the economic agents of production—in land, and capital, and labour. It is true that this conception of private property has been, and will still further be, developed in the direction of conceiving it as in some sense a trust, but remain it must in any society which recognizes the supreme value of the individual. On the subject of trusteeship I will only remark in passing that for every trust there must be a *cestui que* trust, and no one—least of all a Churchman—should accept as self-evident that this *cestui que* trust must be this terrestrial 'community,' still less a purely mechanical aggregate of interests acting by majority.

The second conclusion I would draw need not long detain us, in spite of its importance, as here at least we shall all be at

one. There are limitations on the rights of any majority over the individual. In the religious sphere you would take that for granted; if Christianity is true, then its truth is independent of anyone believing it; if you have a commission, it is not signed by your congregation. But I must use this admission to instil into your minds a salutary doubt of, even a prejudice against, extending the realm of majority compulsion unnecessarily even in the economic sphere. 'Self-government in industry,' for instance, like 'self-determination' a year or two ago, has a fine sound, but are its economic consequences likely to be very different? Once again it is the individual who counts: twenty bankrupt firms won't make one prosperous one—twenty hansom cabs won't combine to make one Ford. In spite of the heavy demand for it, there is plenty of red tape left over after the Government Departments are bundled up.

What is the alternative to this view of human society? I think it is easier to give a convincing answer to the question today than ever before. There is an alternative—a very popular one: to abandon and deride the whole traditional structure of society, to enthrone the State as an idol, whose sacrifices are ourselves, carried out in a more or less bloody manner, as different national temperaments prefer: a society whose equality is the equality of regimented, mass-intoxicated, powerless puppets. Such a society is bound together and inspired by a materialistic conception of history or by a pagan national pride. You at least will not fall into the error of supposing that men and communities of men can live for long without food for more than the body alone, and I do not think the spiritual nourishment offered by those societies will appeal to you.

AN ESTIMATION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE WORK OF MONSIEUR LOISY[1]

By the Rev. L. J. Collins, M.A.

I.

MONSIEUR LOISY is regarded by many as an enemy of the Christian faith. In England particularly he is known to some as a rather splenetic and wildly radical New Testament critic. But it is strange how few English theologians who criticise or are indifferent to him have bothered to read any of his writings other than those specifically dealing with the New Testament. It is in the hope that his work may be more widely appreciated, more reasonably criticised, and in the belief that he has made a very real contribution to the world, that I attempt to give an estimation of the importance of his work.

The life and character of a man in some measure at least will affect his work. In the case of Loisy certain important events and circumstances of his life and significant traits in his character have, in my opinion, considerably affected his judgments as theologian, as moralist, and as critic; and only an understanding of these factors will enable a fair criticism of his work to be made. He has written an admirable autobiography in his three-volume *Mémoires*, published in 1930, from which we may discern factors in his life and character significant in their influence upon his thinking.[2] I am myself privileged to be well acquainted with him, having first met him in September, 1934, since which time we have had many conversations together and a considerable correspondence with each other. The friendship which has developed between us enables me the better to appreciate his work and to mark in what respects the influences of his life have affected his judgments. But this same friendship

[1] Adapted from a paper read on November 17th, 1937, to the Oxford Society of Historical Theology.

[2] For anyone who has not the time to read the *Mémoires* I recommend Loisy's *Choses Passées*, published in 1913, as a guide to his life and character.

precludes me from doing more, in this estimation of the importance of his work, than drawing attention to the significance of certain events and circumstances of his life, and certain characteristics of the man, by deduction from his own writings.

My first impression of Monsieur Loisy was of an alert man, keenly aware of all that was going on in the world, but to a great extent isolated from the general flow of human life. The fuller my acquaintance with him has become, and the deeper our friendship, the more convinced am I that this is true. His whole bearing reveals in him the power which comes to a great man who, in a measure at least, feels himself to be, like Elijah, the one prophet left.

Three important circumstances of his life have led to this 'isolation' of Loisy which is I believe so important and far-reaching a factor in its effects upon his work. First, he suffered during childhood and throughout his younger days from ill-health. We learn this from his *Mémoires*. Children and young men who grow up under the shadow of sickness, if gifted, as is Loisy, with imagination and intellectual ability, often are liable to become isolated from their fellow beings. And the ill-health of Loisy's earlier years, with its concomitant effects, continues to-day and accentuates his 'isolation.'

Secondly, as a young man, M. Loisy was firmly attached to the Roman Church. During his youth this attachment led him to hope that he could carry the Church on his back into a realization of the fullness of its mission in the modern world. His aim was to clothe religion in theological forms which, because of their rationality, their scientific exactitude, and their positive nature, would commend themselves to the modern mind. He desired passionately to do something, something 'de vrai et de bon,' in order to commend the Catholic faith to an age in which science dominated the thoughts of men. His later career led to the development in him of a sense of frustration; the persistent obstacles offered to his aims have therefore accentuated his 'isolation.'

Thirdly, his struggle with official Romanism, with its climax in his excommunication, has placed the coping-stone in the wall of partition between M. Loisy and the world. Not only was he cast adrift from that which he hoped to reform, but also he was

incapacitated by his early attachment to Rome from finding rest in any other Christian body.

This 'isolation' to which M. Loisy has been driven is now a characteristic deeply ingrained in him. Its influence may be seen in his writings, and it should be taken into consideration by those who would criticize and understand his work. To take but one example, this point may be illustrated by drawing attention to his anti-Rome fixation. His dislike and distrust of the Papacy, strengthened by his wide and detailed knowledge of the activities of the Church of Rome in France, is natural. But his 'isolation' has led him to delight in denying any tenet of faith which he believes to be fundamental to the Roman presentation of Christianity; he attacks dogmas held sacred by the Roman Church, and he tries to demonstrate that the Christian origins are second century inventions of ecclesiastically-minded fabricators. His quarrel with the Papacy has caused him to regard all orthodox theologians as intransigeant.

But in spite of his 'isolation' M. Loisy has not so far betaken himself from the world as to cease to be a Frenchman. This fact is of paramount importance in estimating the importance of his work. He possesses to an extreme degree the French wit, and this, added to his natural intellectual brilliance, makes him express himself in a way not generally appreciated by English theologians—a friend of mine well qualified to express an opinion, likened him to Montaigne; he has the wit and brilliance of style of Montaigne, and, like him, he sits in isolation and reviews the world. Let me quote one of his letters to illustrate his caustic wit:

> 'The Catholic Church in England is left out in the recent big promotion of Cardinals which Pius XI has promulgated. They are nearly all Italians. . . . If Duchesne were still alive he would repeat, of the Cardinals, his words on the Creation: "To create is to make something out of nothing."'

It is difficult for English readers to follow the reasoning of such a Frenchman; and unless one is prepared to read his works with the greatest care, their fullest significance passes unnoticed.

Furthermore, Loisy is a Frenchman born and nourished in the French Liberalism of the nineteenth century. His background is not of this present age, and his thought and expres-

sion is coloured by a culture which is of the past. To criticise the writings of Loisy without giving careful consideration to the French Liberalism of the nineteenth century would be as foolish as to criticize the life and thought of Archbishop Davidson without having any knowledge of the Victorians. It is as a French Liberal that he protests against the institutional religion of history. And, being a Frenchman brought up within the Roman Church, he has none of that personal religion which characterizes German and English Protestants. By reason of this he naturally tends towards agnosticism, and even scepticism, in relation to all those experiences which are adduced by the Christian apologists as evidence for Christian dogmas.

I hope that the remarks I have made about Monsieur Loisy may in some measure at least help to throw light on his writings, and assist us in assessing the value of his contribution to the study of theology.

II.

M. Loisy is known in England chiefly as a literary critic of the New Testament. His views are clearly and dogmatically expressed in *La Naissance du Christianisme*, in *Les Origines du Nouveau Testament*, and in *Remarques sur la Literature du Nouveau Testament*. His earlier books on the Synoptic Gospels and on the Acts of the Apostles, useful as commentaries, pale into insignificance beside the later books. It is therefore not on this aspect of his work that I wish to dwell. As literary critic of the New Testament he takes his place among many others and his conclusions must be judged on their merits. The majority of scholars would seem disposed to disagree with him both on his literary analysis of the Gospels and on his theory about the composition of the Acts of the Apostles and the Epistles of St. Paul. It must be admitted that in these matters the wish has often been father to the thought. He claims to use rational and scientific method in his work as New Testament Critic; but too frequently his destruction of the Christian Origins is due as much to his natural scepticism, his anti-Roman bias, and his 'isolationist' characteristics, as to reasoned judgments.

But to admit the tendentiousness of some of his conclusions, and to question their validity, should not, as many would seem to suppose, confer a right to banish him henceforth from further consideration, and doom him to entire neglect. For underlying his New Testament criticism there are presuppositions and constructive suggestions, both theological and ethical, that are most worthy of our attention.

Of these the most cognate to his New Testament criticism is his positivist approach to history, and in particular the history which it has been claimed that the Gospels set forth. He produces a wealth of argument to throw in doubt their historicity as records of fact; and he claims that, so far as the records are concerned, we can state with any degree of certainty only the bare facts about Jesus that he was a deluded prophet who went up to Jerusalem to proclaim the Kingdom of God, and he paid the penalty of his folly by being put to death as a criminal. A wide acceptance of this view would certainly endanger the fabric of historical Christianity. But Loisy's view is very incompletely understood if his philosophy of history is neglected. He is not merely trying, like so many before him, to 'rationalise' the Gospel, or to expose an imposture of 1,900 years' standing. He claims that his approach to the New Testament is scientific, and he concludes by scientific method that, since all the records were written in the light of Christian faith in the Resurrection, none of them can be adduced as testimonies to the objectivity of the facts they claim to record. On a scientific basis the only facts which can be demonstrated are those which would enable the drawing of such a rude and bare picture as he attempts to present.

But he does not leave us with a dethroned Messiah; he is saved from this by his doctrine that history is compact of fact and interpretation, so mutually mingled that separation is impossible and, even if possible, unprofitable. Scientific analysis can neither validate nor invalidate the Gospel records. It is faith which gives significance to events; and history is made up of events interpreted by faith into terms significant for humanity. Loisy therefore lays great stress on the dynamic nature of all religious belief; faith is for him the most important

element in the production of a religious literature. His views on the historicity of the Gospel records I can best illustrate by the answers he wrote to me to some questions I put to him :

1. Can we call that historical which, while being incapable of scientific demonstration, conforms to the faith of humanity and is of value in the life of humanity?

'Bare history, which is only a fact, a physical reality as any other natural phenomenon, does not exist for human facts; one could not think of human facts which omitted what they contain of humanity, that is, their spiritual aspect. Christianity therefore signifies a progress of humanity in the life of the Spirit.'

2. How far can the Gospel stories be called historical if one can say that they have been written in the light of faith?

'There is no direct or complete proof of religious facts which may be known apart from the light of faith. An unbeliever seeing only the exterior does not feel the deep reality of the religious phenomenon. It is faith itself which is the soul of the fact. This soul matters much more than the material reality of the event. The exact relation of the real action of Jesus seen by a witness not belonging to the Jewish faith would help us to fix the background of the Gospel, but would be able to teach us nothing of the true sense of the Gospel preaching.'

3. Is faith at its best a proof of what is historical?

'It is indeed the character of the faith which determines the value of the religious fact with which it is concerned.'

4. Is the faith of Peter in the Resurrection proof of the greatness of Jesus?

'The moral value of Peter's faith implies the moral greatness of the Gospel and of Jesus which inspired Peter's faith.'

Faith is, then, for Loisy the dynamic force in the moral development of humanity. And the recognition of the importance of faith is the key to an understanding of the meaning of history. The Christian origins are no evidence for the truth of the facts they record; but they are evidence for the faith of the early Christians. That is to say the Jesus of History of Liberal Protestantism is, by Loisy, reduced to a mere shadow. But in its place there is erected a Jesus of faith who enters into history just because He is the ground of Christian faith. And in so far as Christian faith in Christ is proved valid in human life the Christian origins are established as historical documents whose value for humanity is unquestionable.

Loisy's views about the historicity of the Gospels have laid him open to attack on the ground that he makes a sharp distinction between two separate and distinguished kinds of truth—

truths of faith and truths of fact. Let me, in rebutting this attack, quote from a letter:

> 'In what regards specially the Resurrection, I have already in *L'Evangile et L'Eglise* contested the historicity of the records, and I added that the truth of the Resurrection for faith was not compromised by this contesting. It has been concluded that, according to me, the fact of the Resurrection could be false for history and true for theology. I have never been fool enough to advance such theories!'

There is a direct denial of the charge in this excerpt. Loisy would have it understood that a dogma, supposedly resting upon the occurrence of an event, may still be true even if the supposed event did not happen as it is represented to have done. The Resurrection of Jesus, for example, can be attested not by trying to prove that the event took place in the way recorded in the Gospels, but by evaluating the faith of Peter which supposed it to have taken place. It is probably a fair criticism of Loisy to say that he does not recognize that it is no easier to disprove the occurrence of an event than it is to prove it; and, in the case of the Resurrection of Jesus, he seems unduly to emphasise the faith of Peter without justifying its existence. But it is certainly untrue to say that he recognizes a double standard of truth, one for science and one for value.

In order fully to appreciate the work of Loisy on the Christian origins it is necessary to be familiar with his theological presuppositions and tenets. Yet even if he had no more to offer the world than his views on the historicity of the Gospel records, we should be able to grant his work to be particularly worthy of attention on two scores. First, there is value in his *reductio ad absurdum* of the Liberal Protestant attempt to build Christianity on the foundation of certain scientifically attested facts, to bolster up Christian dogma with the proved certainty of events —that bubble has been well pricked. Secondly, by emphasising the part played by faith in the construction of religious origins he removes the problem of assessing the value of Christian dogmas from the sphere of scientific investigation alone. Faith, he believes, is from God. And the faith of Peter in the Resurrection of Jesus accounted for the birth of Christianity. Thus, if Loisy be right, we are led to study the New Testament afresh in its true setting, without being hindered by the fear which

forbids an honest approach to it. It becomes the duty of every Christian apologist to face the problem of working out a satisfactory philosophy of history and to estimate the value and significance of the faith to which the New Testament is a witness. This is not to deny the historical in Christianity; it is to acknowledge that the facts have been hidden in a welter of interpretations.

We pass, then, from the special subject of the historicity of the Gospels to those wider aspects of Loisy's theological thought which are the foundation for his work as critic. He set out as a young man to interpret the faith in terms of the science which was then the intellectual fashion. And he has always remained true to his resolve to subject the Christian origins and Christian dogmas to such scrutiny as shall, in his opinion, enable them to be presented in a form comprehensible by the modern mind. He has a respect for logical demonstration; and he insists that truth must be verifiable within the ordinary developing life of humanity. Above all he would hate to be a teacher of esoteric doctrine or superstitious mysteries; for to him the truth must be made explicable in terms of the world around us. To speak of a direct relationship between God and man, he believes, is to dabble in magic; and magic is by definition inexplicable in terms of the ordinary developing life of humanity. His break with Rome gave impetus to his insistence that evidences of supernatural intrusion into the natural world are figments of man's imagination.

These aims, together with the fact that Loisy is a product of French nineteenth-century Liberalism, have largely influenced the whole of his work. But his contributions to the study of theology are none the less real. And it is to two basic elements in his thought, the one constructive and the other destructive, that I would specially draw attention.

First, he has a powerful faith as a moralist. He believes in the progressive development of humanity in moral education. But he is no mere positivist; for the movement of humanity towards its fulfilment in moral perfection, guided as he believes it to be by 'the lights in their generations,' is actuated by *L'Esprit* of God. And humanity does not move towards its own

apotheosis but towards human perfection. For him religions are but temporal representations of *la religion*; mysticism is the way of knowledge; and theology is but a temporary and changing clothing in which unknown mystical truths are dressed—there is therefore no harm done if sartorial fashions change. Thus in his book *George Tyrrell et Henri Bremond* he says:

> 'Bremond and I, equally placed in the sphere of mysticism . . . had the duty of putting ourselves outside all confessions, all particular religions, in order to construct our philosophy';

and in his *Mémoires* he says:

> 'Theology is one thing and religion another. Religion is eternal; theology is only the theory, always capable of being perfected, of religion.'

This faith in humanity is a positive contribution made by Loisy to the study of theology; and it is salutary, especially to-day when Karl Barth's influence is strong, to turn to the works of Loisy and find written in them a conviction well supported that Christianity has no meaning apart from the history of humanity. But it must not be thought that he understands moral progress in terms of humanism; this is especially borne out in the Appendix (entitled *Le Probleme des Origines Chrétiennes*) to his book *Mandeisme et Origines Chrétiennes*, a particularly important essay for the understanding of his views. His correspondence with me has made this point clear; in replying to a question put to him he wrote:

> 'There is no "purely human" where conscience is concerned. I have never said that the teaching of Jesus contains nothing more than eschatology . . . There was with and in this eschatology a purity of moral ideal which would not suit the "purely human" if the "purely human" existed.'

And in the appendix referred to he writes:

> 'It would not be possible to have a great human problem which has not a religious aspect. If it is nature which has made man, it is religion which has made humanity.'

Further, in his latest book,[3] published a few weeks ago, he writes:

> 'It is the reign of the spirit which is the true reign of God on the earth.'

For Loisy, then, humanity is the general conception of a race infused with Spirit; the individual lives in humanity, and con-

[3] *La Crise Morale du temps présent et l'Éducation Humaine.*

tributes to its general purpose, the fulfilling of God's will in terms of the active spirit.

Secondly, Monsieur Loisy is an agnostic. His agnosticism, strengthened by the circumstances of his life, has led him to deny the possibility of what he calls the intrusion of the magical supernatural. And his strong conviction of the validity of the moral demands made upon man through the enlightenment of humanity causes him to be suspicious of anything which detracts from the fulness of the responsibility of man for his own moral behaviour. He sees therefore in any static system of dogmatics and in any emphasis upon the supposed intrusion of the supernatural into the natural world the way open for superstition and a consequent weakening of moral purpose in men.

> 'The negation of the magical supernatural has never been for me, it is not now, a postulate; it has been, it always is, only a conclusion, a conviction, progressively acquired, in spite of myself, through evidence which I could not resist without lying.'[4]

But that Loisy believes in the validity of the witness of religious experience to the supernatural and the numinous is evident. He said in reply to a question I put to him:

> 'I avoid the terms *transcendence* and *immanence* in connection with philosophical conceptions which appear to me to be more or less old-fashioned. Following the great mystics, I forbid myself the right to define God. That is not to deny him; it is because I believe all human thought inadequate before the supreme reality and therefore before what you call the supernatural.'

In *La Crise Morale* he condemns those who would suggest that science and modern knowledge have proved all religious experience of the numinous to be but a disease, and he whole-heartedly dissociates himself from those who would reduce morality to a human institution explicable in terms of sociological or political ideals. He suggests that anyone who does not tremble, as did Pascal, before the Infinite has not understood it; such a one merely lacks 'Le sens de l'Infini Vivant.' Scientists and philosophers who deny the mystery of Providence illustrate, he says, only their own blindness; modern prophecies and abstractions which would displace the outworn mythologies of the past with the suppositions that the evolution of society is automatic, that there is no moral sense in humanity, that morality is merely custom demanding the respect or fear of man, fail to apprehend

[4] *La Crise Morale*, page 33.

the true significance of human history and are blind to the truth that the desire for a more just social order is founded upon a principle superior to the material with which it is concerned.

The agnosticism of Loisy is then, I am convinced, very largely due to his fear of the damaging effect upon the moral evolution of humanity of superstition and ignorant authoritarianism; it has been accentuated by his break with Rome; and it has become the complement of his emphasis upon the importance of faith in religion. But his agnostic outlook is wholly admirable in so far as it contributes to the denial of a false view of the meaning of revelation. He fully recognises the possibility of revelation which conforms to the moral enlightenment of humanity; but he rigorously rejects any suggestion that God may intrude himself into the world in such a way as to offend the moral conscience of humanity. Further, his insistence on the ineffability of God and his concentration upon the reality of the spiritual aspect of the moral sense in humanity give to his work an importance which is both real and far reaching, particularly in an age when God is grossly humanized and Christian morality is defied.

We may question the belief of Loisy in humanity; we may deplore his agnosticism; and we may regret his failure to rid himself of the effects of those events and characteristics of his life which have so influenced his work. But to have studied his writings and to have recognised their importance, particularly in regard to his belief in humanity and his agnosticism in the face of the supernatural, is to place ourselves in a position strong in the denial of the suggestion that he is simply a wild anti-Christian New Testament critic. And the two factors in his theological outlook which I have specially chosen to place before you are in themselves challenging.

The chief significance of the work of Loisy is not in that he destroys the historicity of the Gospel records; it lies in the fearlessness with which he questions all dogmas and presuppositions based upon the Christian writings, in his emphasis on the part played by human faith in the religious development of humanity, and in his refusal to allow the authority of Scripture to rest upon appeals to superstition and ignorance. His moral approach to theology, together with

his conviction that all religions are but the forms of a religion which is eternal, in placing responsibility for its own moral development upon humanity itself, may well save Christianity from choking itself with its own dogmas and from stunting its growth by a refusal to transform itself into each new age. That certain fundamental and significant events took place in the world in the birth, death, and Resurrection of Jesus, events which were acts of God's self-revelation, every Christian must accept. But this acceptance is by faith; and only a faith which *lives* in a changing humanity is capable of establishing its own validity. M. Loisy no more calls himself a Christian; but he yet believes that the faith of Peter represents the highest mark reached within the moral and spiritual development of humanity. And I believe that it is largely due to the peculiar circumstances of his own life that he refuses to accept the truth of the events which Peter supposed had given rise to his faith.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE PRAISES OF WISDOM*

This work is an edition of *Wisdom,* i.1-ix.18 + xi. 23-26, and comprises a short Introduction (5 pages), the Greek Text with an English Translation on opposite pages, a Commentary, and a Select Glossary (47 words).

The Introduction gives a brief account of the place of the book in Hebrew literature, the object of the author in writing it, its date, and its influence on the N.T. Technicalities are avoided and a clear statement of essentials results. Mr. Blakeney, while acknowledging that most editors believe in the unity of the book, finds it 'admittedly hard to acquiesce in this belief' (p. 3), and this admission, coupled with the fact that he edits Part I only, prompts the suspicion that he inclines to an hypothesis of dual authorship, though he will not commit himself. 'If the book is *not* composite, but the result of *one* man's thoughts, we might infer that it consists of two quite separate treatises, written at widely different dates, but brought together into an easy cohesion' (p. 3). And there he leaves us—with an illustration from Tennyson.

The origin of the Greek Text is not disclosed, but from the material at my disposal I judge it to be the editor's own—eclectic rather than that of any single MS or group of MSS or printed edition. However, Mr. Blakeney

* *The Praises of Wisdom: Being Part I of the Book of Wisdom. A Revised Translation with Notes.* By E. H. Blakeney, M.A. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1937. 7/6 net.)

has clearly had difficulty in securing agreement in reading between his text and translation: one must suppose that through oversight he forgot in every case to alter the text of the edition with which he was working into conformity with the reading he preferred. It is true that at v. 14 he himself saw before publication that πάχνη (= hoar-frost) was not happily rendered 'foam' and corrected it accordingly in his *Corrigenda* to ἄχνη (adding by way of explanation '*though some MSS give* πάχνη'—although in his note on the verse he only mentions the third variant ἀράχνη!); but at ii.7 he reads in the text with ℵ B etc. καὶ μὴ παροδευσάτω ἡμᾶς ἄνθος ἀέρος (= air), and yet translates with A and most editions 'nor let any spring (= ἔαρος) flower pass us by.' We should add to the *Corrigenda* by analogy '*Page* 10, *line* 25. *For* ἀέρος *read* ἔαρος (*though some MSS give* ἀέρος).

Anyone who is familiar with Mr. Blakeney's previous work will approach his Translation with great expectations. 'The Translation is based on the Authorized Version, but a great many new renderings have been introduced' he assures us in the Preface; yet he is unduly modest, for there is considerably less of the Authorized Version than might be supposed from his own statement. A high standard is maintained throughout, even if the renderings are occasionally unnecessarily free, *e.g.* τοῖς μὴ ἀπιστοῦσιν αὐτῷ in i.2 rendered 'unto such as trust Him' or τῶν δεδομένων in vii.15 rendered 'of the good things given.'

The Commentary is neither that of a specialist nor a mere abridgement of the specialists' works: it is the commentary of a well-educated layman, who is illustrating the text before him out of the accumulated riches of his own wide reading. Solon, Horace, Eusebius, Lactantius, St. Bernard, John of Salisbury, Hobbes, Pope, Tennyson, the Hermetic Writings, the Rig-Veda, the Book of Common Prayer, and many more, vie with each other in providing parallels to the thought of the Book of Wisdom. It is in this wealth of illustration that the chief value of the Commentary lies, so that 'professed scholars' (for whom Mr. Blakeney says his 'notes are plainly not intended'—*Preface*) as well as 'the ordinary reader' must read it with profit. The notes themselves are commendably short and free from the vice of paraphrasing the obvious, though those accustomed to the old-fashioned commentator's style might find them curt: take for example the note on ii.21:—'The denial of immortality is a sign of moral obliquity. Read the passage in Hooker E.P. v, § 2.'

The Glossary might well have been incorporated in the Commentary at the appropriate points; for it is hardly detailed enough to stand alone, and there is always the danger that the reader will forget its existence and omit to look up an interesting word in search of further information.

On the book as a book, the publisher is to be congratulated. I should have preferred the Text and Translation to have been arranged in *stichoi* as in Sweet's Septuagint and the Revised Version; but no doubt space was a consideration. The chapter-numeration too might have been recorded on each page of the Text as well as the verse-numeration—the lack of this is

particularly awkward on p. 34 where one jumps after three asterisks from verse 18 to the middle of verse 23, without any indication whatsoever that the chapter has changed from ix to xi. There is furthermore a certain absence of uniformity in references—thus we read 'logos-doctrine' on p. 5 but 'Logos doctrine' on p. 53; Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity* is cited as E.P. v, § 2' on p. 39, but as '*Eccl. P.* VI. v, § 1' on p. 44, and as '*Eccl. P.* I.vii.7' on p. 47. 'Oxyr. Pap.' on p. 50, l. 23, should be in italics. On p. 36, l. 31 an '1' has dropped out. In the *Corrigenda*, l. 5, '21' should read '20' and '*though*' looks a little odd. But these are minor blemishes, and I would hesitate to name them blemishes were not 'this unpretentious little volume' (*Preface*) more than just a volume. It is a work of art.

HEDLEY F. D. SPARKS.

AN ASTRONOMICAL WELTANSCHAUUNG*

This is a book of the Everlasting No. The author, an 'inspector of Czech public instruction in Austria,' has evidently saturated his mind with the writings of astronomers and read widely among the metaphysicians, with some preference for the more sceptical. The result is atheism, with the repudiation of any glowing hope for humanity. The best that we can expect, he thinks, is a 'silver world,' certainly not a golden one, in a somewhat distant future, when men will treat each other kindly and have abolished the worst diseases. But they will still die, and after a few million years the race will perish, as the globe becomes uninhabitable from the sun's loss of heat. He will not allow us the consolation of belief in life after death, though he neglects to state his grounds for this denial.

He dilates on the comparative minuteness of the space occupied by life. 'In the Einstein universe of the fourth order alone the cubic content of the animate amounts to $\frac{1}{10^{100}}$ of the inanimate, if not only the space but also the time factor be taken into consideration' (p. 88). (He delights in enormous numbers.) Consequently, he argues, the Universe as a whole is indifferent to life—in fact, without purpose, unconscious. 'The psychical is an imperceptible glimmer of tiny sparks in the midst of an ocean of corpse-like spatial and temporal inanimateness' (p. 117). Moreover, there is much suffering in such life as there is, which clearly shows the non-existence of God. Nevertheless human life could be improved and will, in the course of many centuries, become fairly happy as the result of increasing enlightenment. Dr. Jahn is concerned to refute spiritualistic and idealistic types of thought, which he calls 'S-philosophy,' and to establish an 'O-philosophy'—in other words, to make the objective primary, and the subjective secondary. Not that anything definite can be known about the ultimate reality. However, he makes various dogmatic assertions about what it is not. It is not personal, or conscious, or good. He gives us a very long and discursive chapter entitled 'The Way to the Ultimate,' which is a fair example of 'the night in which all cows are black.'

* *The Silver World, An Essay on the Ultimate Problems of Philosophy.* By Aegidius Jahn, Ph.D. (Allen and Unwin. 1937. 12/6.)

Dr. Jahn's metaphysics are excessively fine-spun, not to say thin. Like the 'metagalactic universe,' which he is so fond of talking about, they give an impression of vast space with comparatively little matter in it.

Though he is scornful of belief in God, Dr. Jahn betrays a tendency to something akin to worship. But it is directed, polytheistically, to the giant stars. He seems, metaphorically, almost to prostrate himself before Betelgeuse,

> 'five hundred million kilometres in diameter, fifty million times greater than our sun, sixty billion times greater than the earth. It glows with enormous heat; on the surface it is in fact relatively cold, but it is therefore all the more incandescent in its interior. There the temperature amounts to perhaps some tens of millions of degrees' (p. 321).

He fully shares Kant's awe of the starry heavens, but not his at least equal reverence for the moral law—'his foolish categorical imperative,' he unkindly calls it (p. 356). Can it be that astronomy is apt to appal and crush the spirit of man, if not combined with more vital and human interests? May we recommend to Dr. Jahn the study of psychology, especially in its bearing on the question of the survival of death? It might lead him to a better understanding of spiritualism in the higher sense of the word and from that he might come to religion. F. A. M. SPENCER.

A PUZZLING LABYRINTH*

One cannot help concluding, after reading Mr. Jackson Knight's *Cumaean Gates*, that the alliance between the archaeologist, the philologist, and the psycho-analyst is an unnatural one and produces strange results.

Mr. Knight begins by proclaiming his belief in the view of time which has found its latest exponent in Mr. J. B. Priestley, 'that events, belonging in the ordinary sense to different times, can exist together within one consciousness.' Especially, he thinks, the greatest writers have 'the power to find contacts further back in time' than the average person, and to penetrate more deeply into 'the unconscious memory of the race.'

After Dr. Broad's searching criticisms of the conception of unconscious memory, it is necessary always to be on one's guard when this term arises. But, given the validity of this conception, and the facts which it claims to explain, we must obviously not apply it if simpler every-day explanations are adequate. In fact Mr. Knight really admits this; though he does not act up to his admission.

His theme is the 'initiation pattern,' which was in its beginning a myth of the common source of life, and of death which is a new beginning of life. This pattern, with its cave, which is also the womb, its river of Oceanus or of Styx, beyond which is the abode of the dead in a new life, the labyrinth which is a device for keeping out intruders—Spirits in particular, for a Spirit, as is well known in Chinese lore, can only travel in a straight line—reproduces itself not only in primitive art but in such a late sophisticated work as Virgil's *Aeneid*. At Cumae, does not the Sibyl lead Aeneas (twice)

* *Cumaean Gates*. By W. F. Jackson Knight. (Blackwell. 7/6.)

to a cave? Is not the Temple of Apollo at that place ornamented with a labyrinth? Does not the hero in the world below find his Father (*i.e.* the 'Dead King'), whom the hero of the institution visited has to revive, and so on, in many other details?

But Mr. Knight tells us in the end (p. 174) that 'Virgil has made this, the quest of Aeneas, a new creation, by means of one of his delicate changes, because the race memory strong in him guided him along the ancient pattern; *or he may have known that pattern by more conscious means*' (the italics are mine).

Exactly, but why presuppose anything except 'the more conscious means'? *Entia non sunt multiplicanda.* It has long been admitted that Virgil introduced a good deal of the lore of the mysteries into the Sixth Aeneid. Why then suggest that 'the archetypal pattern' arose from his 'unconscious memory,' when he was most probably relating what he had heard of, if not seen? *Sit mihi fas audita loqui!*

The extravagance of these inferences a good deal mars the very considerable interest of the 'initiation pattern' as it is presented in this book with numerous examples. Mr. Knight admits that 'facts have attracted myths.' The history of the Christian religion alone sufficiently shows it. It is plain too in the history of Troy. But the sophisticated poet finds the myths to hand. They have passed down from mouth to mouth and writing to writing, and he makes his own artistic use of them.

Apart from this, the evolution of the labyrinth is a most important development. It not only explains, as I have said, the mystic coils of Styx, which puzzled me so as a boy when I tried to discover how Styx, if it coiled 'novies interfus,' could really be crossed. It also explains the odd appearance of the viscera as a symbol in primitive art. It possibly explains Dante's circles of the purgatorio, which are a combination of the theory of Elysium beneath and of heaven above. There is the labyrinthine pattern, but it guards the approach to the *upper* realms.

If the author's deductions in themselves are not wholly credible, they become less so in the light of some of his quite obvious errors—*e.g.* in the realm of philology. He tells us ingeniously enough, that 'a root can generally be found to fit a theory.' It can indeed. We cannot help becoming distrustful when we are presented with such odd statements as on p. 55, that 'In Latin the word is *mundus*, which seems to be at least cognate with the French for "world," "monde," and the German for "mouth," "mund."' Are we really to understand that 'monde' is not *derived* from 'mundus,' but racially remembered perhaps!

Again, in the quite engaging account of the 'Ludus Trojae,' as described in Aen. V, with its labyrinthine movements of horsemen—'alternos orbibus orbes impediunt'—the whole is spoilt by the fantastic suggestion on p. 78 that 'impediunt' is 'significantly' used to indicate that a 'magical field of exclusive force' is intended. Does not impedire mean to 'tie up,' quite obviously in this context, just as expedire means 'to untie'? To make it mean 'prevent' here — but I forgot; the unconscious memory of Virgil

may have been at work! After which, is it to be wondered at that we are told (p. 170) that 'a male principle is seen in Fascism now, always fighting a form of female principle which has found its way into Communism, and lost much of itself as it went'? Alas! we cannot but feel that people lose something of themselves, some balance of judgment, when they first become entangled in the pattern of the labyrinth. GUY KENDALL.

THE CORPUS CHRISTIANUM*

This book was written as Prolegomena to last July's Oecumenical Conference on 'Church, Community and State,' and one can say at once that it admirably fulfils its purpose.

The experience at Stockholm in 1925 had revealed the emptiness of the hope that there could be a consensus of ethical opinion apart from underlying theological principles. So after a brief foreword on the present critical situation of both the world and the Church, Dr. 't Hooft proceeds to give a penetrating analysis of the various doctrines of the Church obtaining among Roman Catholics, Orthodox, Anglicans, Lutherans and other Protestants, ending with a short section on Modernism. The next chapter deals briefly with the actual record of the several churches, including the younger Churches in Africa and the East, particularly in regard to their relations with the State. The survey is both candid and incisive. The third chapter, on 'the Church as an Oecumenical Society,' indicates the resultant issues to be faced by the Oxford Conference. Dr. 't Hooft notes general agreement that there is essentially only *one* Church, not exhaustively expressed in any Christian Body. Some would regard the existing churches as branches of the one true Church—but the branches are sadly divergent: a truer view sees the true Church to be still largely transcendent of our human institutions: the Oxford Conference cannot therefore claim to represent the Church, but it should 'be ready to be used as the Church of God, if God wants to use it in such a way' (p. 99).

At this point Dr. Oldham takes up the tale. After a short chapter on 'the Predicament of the Church,' whose chief weakness he sees in the predominance of clericalism, he passes on to his main theme—'the Church in the World.' Here too there is a bewildering variety of outlook, from the *Weltflucht* of most mystics to the complete *Politisierung* of some branches of the Orthodox Church. But the main 'Catholic' view is that of Aquinas, that 'grace does not destroy nature but presupposes and perfects it' (p. 129): and this, when freed of its clericalist corollaries, he takes to be the true view. Slightly different is the Orthodox doctrine of the deification of the world (p. 132), which tends towards a 'mystical identity of Church and world rather than to a hierarchical view of lower and higher orders in the framework of a continuity of being.' But to the Continental Reformers both these views seem to underestimate '*quanti ponderis sit*

* *The Church and its Function in Society.* By W. A. V. 't Hooft and J. H. Oldham. (Allen and Unwin. 1937. 8/6.)

peccatum'; for most Lutherans the Church of God is completely separate from the world: yet when thinkers like Gogarten regard the 'world' as created, though not redeemed, by God, they are returning to some extent to the Thomist doctrine of natural law. More important, however, than denominational differences is the division of those who agree that it *is* the Church's task to influence society here and now into (*a*) the uncompromising school, whose classic representative was Calvin, which stresses the transcendence of God and the aloofness of the Church from secular values, and (*b*) the evolutionary or optimistic view (of which the Bishop of Durham and Professor Raven are cited as examples) which regards Christianity as the culmination of a universal process. Dr. Oldham insists that justice must be done to both these views: 'between these two poles the Christian life must continually revolve.'

What, then, are the chief functions of the Church in facing the world? Fundamentally they are the reception and the passing on of God's word to man—by the type of *worship* that is not 'an escape . . . into a world of soothing hopes and transient and ineffective aspirations,' but an 'active dedication of the will to a God who is overflowingly alive and has positive ends for the world'; by a Christian *love* which is not just sentimental or humanitarian, but 'has its spring in the costly self-giving of Christ,' finds its objects 'in those who are unlovely and naturally repellent,' and works in the pastoral cure of souls, which is the responsibility, not of the clergy and pastors alone, but of all members of the Christian Community; and by a *theology* which will seek 'to grasp the whole first-century Gospel in its . . reality, and then make the bold and even perilous attempt to translate the whole into contemporary terms.'

An example of the difficulty of this task is to be found in modern society in

> 'the complication, insignificant in the time of Christ, of group relations, where ethical judgment is made on behalf of the individual in some delegated area of his rights without engaging his whole personality.'

The author of these words, Sir Josiah Stamp, is quoted again as urging that the whole body of ethics needs to be recast in the world of modern corporate relations: and another writer as saying that

> 'neither the cardinal virtues of the Greeks, nor the Christian virtues of faith, hope, and charity, nor yet . . . meekness, gentleness, long-suffering, and so forth, are able to establish themselves as the essentially vital attitudes which it is necessary to adopt in order to . . . meet the demands which life makes upon men. The dwindling private relationships of man call for these, but not the work of the world' (p. 182).

(This surely is overstated: the existence of Zealots, Samaritans, and tax-gatherers, and various *collegia* presented similar, although less complicated, problems in the time of our Lord.) The difficulty is further emphasized by a picture of the variety of the sources of social evil, those 'satanic powers' against which individuals cannot successfully contend alone.

But precisely this fact opens up new possibilities for the fellowship of the Church. It is (in the words of Prof. Brunner) in the

> 'borderland between technical action and ethics—in economics, in politics, in public life—that the great decisions are made. If the Christian ethic fails at this point, it fails all along the line' (p. 190).

In facing this challenge Dr. Oldham is careful to distinguish between the witness of the Church as an organized society and the incomparably greater activity of its individual members in their several walks of life: this latter could be greatly increased by the adoption of new methods and institutional forms on the part of churches which at present fail to satisfy the religious needs of thousands — above all by relating the ministries of the Church more intimately to the specific tasks of the common life, by more definite ethical guidance, and by the multiplication of small functional and local groups of Christians for discussion and action. With regard to the intervention of the Church in its corporate capacity in political affairs, Dr. Oldham is supremely cautious. This involves the dangers (*a*) of loss of religious depth, (*b*) of confusion over means and ends, and (*c*) of decisions being taken over without a full sense of responsibility (as was the case with much of the ecclesiastical control of the political and economic spheres in the Middle Ages). At the same time there is a place for official pronouncements, so long as they are responsible and it is clear who are committed by them. At least those attitudes which are a plain denial of the Christian understanding of life—such as the worship of riches or power over other men, or the claim of the national state to be the ultimate authority in matters of faith and conduct—should be denounced as heresies incompatible with the Christian faith. This book raises many more questions than it answers. But it is no small achievement to have asked the right questions. And although a 'free-lance' book on the subject might have been yet more stimulating and conducive to the vigorous action and risk-taking for which Dr. Oldham calls, it is hard to imagine one that could discuss controversial issues of burning importance with greater balance and sanity. We can feel confident about the development of the Oecumenical Movement, so long as its direction remains in these hands. H. P. KINGDON.

A DEFENCE OF TRADITIONALIST MORALITY*

This book consists of a series of broadcast talks with a few additional elucidatory essays. It deals in a fresh and incisive way with the kind of question so often asked by the modern thinking man; and the fact that it bears the *Nihil obstat* and *Imprimatur* to which we are accustomed in the books of our Roman clerics should not disturb the reader unduly in spite of the forbidding philosophy of authoritarianism which the familiar words may suggest to his mind. Fr. D'Arcy's discussions of urgent ethical problems do not call excessive attention to the views of Roman authority, or

* *Christian Morals.* By the Very Rev. M. C. D'Arcy, S.J. (Longmans, Green & Co. 1937. 5/- net.)

what he himself calls once or twice 'the Catholic position,' and are characterised by frank, and often penetrating, judgments.

The directing thought running through the essays is that humanity's present troubles tend to short-sightedness, and that to-day there is no current philosophy of life which gives any perspective to human life and its meaning. What is wanted, he thinks, is an 'inflexible ideal of man': this will lead to right judgments on such debatable issues as euthanasia, birth control, private and personal rights in a State, and so on. Some of the new moralists, he maintains, hold philosophic views which may make their moral enthusiasms hard to understand;

> 'for if man be not free, if he be a creature of instincts or galvanized into activity by glands or unconscious or economic factors, there seems no reason why there should be all this shouting in the market-place about what cannot be helped.'

Fr. D'Arcy is surely right when he declares that

> 'we are arguing very unreasonably if we take morals as quite independent of our general view of ourselves and the purposes of the universe.'

But his dialectical methods are not always convincing: certainly they are not couched in the persuasive and just style likely to lead to the conversion of his opponents. Speaking, for example, of those 'who never give a thought to whether man has but a short span of years and then extinction or an immortal happiness in store for him,' and who 'seem quite sure they know what is the best thing for him to do now,' he adds:

> 'For my own part I am sure I would behave quite differently if I thought this universe had no author, and that behind nature there lay nothing but a blank inane.'

This passage is characteristic of the debating style of the author, and suggests more of cleverness than cogency. Later, Fr. D'Arcy, maintaining that

> 'it surely makes a vital difference whether a man is to be treated as an animal or higher than an animal, whether he is capable of improving himself freely or is the outcome of his time and place, whether justice or chance rule the earth and death swallow up all ambitions,'

goes on to make a personal avowal kindred to the above-mentioned. 'If I were assured,' he says, 'that cats and dogs had unending life and that their status in the next world were dependent on their conduct in this I would behave very differently to them.' Many, on the other hand, believe that they would continue to act towards domestic animals with the consideration they *know* to be right even in the absence of a specific creed about their future destiny. T. H. Huxley, who himself declared that 'right practice depends on right theory,' might from such utterances as the above have received a moral shock similar to that which he describes when at a funeral service he heard read the words, 'If the dead are not raised, let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die.' The *implications* of this moral shock—or of this knowledge that right is right, whatever the consequences—is, of course, the real issue, as Fr. D'Arcy well knows: these involve to the theistic philosopher the faith in the dignity and value of human personality, which faith is itself

grounded in the faith in the living God. There is no more urgent task than the restoration of these twin faiths among the thoughtful, but perplexed, men of our generation.

The way in which this can be done cannot be dissociated from the grounds on which this faith rests. Fr. D'Arcy's method is that of brilliant dialectic: his book is full of incisive utterances which lend themselves well to quotation. 'We are dying to-day,' he says, 'for want of dogma, for the soul of man unless it be fed on truth wanders restlessly in dry places.' But 'precisely what dogmas, and on what grounds are we asked to believe them,' is the inevitable reply. Until these questions are fully and frankly faced the recovery of religious conviction among sincere and perplexed 'humanists' will be delayed. C. J. WRIGHT.

MYSTICISM AND SANITY*

In his new book, *The Philosophic Basis of Mysticism,* Professor Hywel Hughes has done an incalculable service to religion, and to that most widely misunderstood and criticized form of religious experience known as mysticism. This is a sanely reasoned and carefully argued plea for its absolute validity and normality (the word 'normal' not being taken here to mean 'ordinary'). Indeed, he urges that religious truths are always in the first instance based on mystic experience. Here he stresses the essential difference between a traditional faith, 'which acceptance, however, is not really religious,' and the unassailable faith that is born of an experience of the spirit of man in relation to God.

Possibly the most interesting sections to the modern mind are those in which he carefully examines the psycho-analytical approach to mysticism, and while admitting that there are unquestionably many instances where trance-experiences falsely called mystical are in actual fact pathological, by far the greater number of spiritual experiences have no basis in psychological aberration whatsoever. He urges, as William James in his *Varieties of Religious Experience,* that the fruits must be the criterion. Pathological conditions, he points out, produce only lethargy, and a deeper indulgence in the experience for its own sake; true mysticism stirs the mystic to a life of creative good in the world; also—which is strongly opposed to the post-trance conditions in the abnormal—

> 'there is, in the mystic, a constant and permanent elevation of mind and heart. . . . This is not lost even in the period of "dryness," or "the dark night of the soul." In the mystics . . . the oscillation is not merely one of vital tone, nor is the swing back ever so great as to break away from, or annul, the prevailing sense of exaltation and enlargement of life' (p. 329).

This 'sense of exaltation and enlargement of life' is indeed peculiar to all in whom the Spirit of God is an indwelling force; it could not be otherwise; it is the 'star which guides through all darkness,' deepening, colouring and enriching every moment of life, and in the mystics, who live in conscious

* *The Philosophic Basis of Mysticism.* T. Hywel Hughes. (T. and T. Clark. 1937. 12/6.)

communion with the Divine, the sense of exaltation and significance must necessarily be a powerful agent for good and creative action:

> 'After the experience . . . there is an acquisition of power that enables the mystic to do and endure great things. In one case, then (the pathological) strength is taken away from man; virtue goes out of him; in the other (the mystic experience) strength is added to him, and he is reinforced from some secret source of power. This difference is sufficient to prove that the two experiences are essentially dissimilar and that they belong to different levels of being (p 216).

There are few aspects of philosophy or psychology in relation to mysticism that Prof. Hughes has not touched on, and while he clearly sympathizes with and understands the mystic point of view he remains rigorously just to his opponents in thought, and deals fairly, and adequately, with the counter-arguments. Such a work as this is in itself an earnest of the unity in diversity which is the root-faith of all mysticism: in the last resort there is no conflict between the 'two and seventy jarring sects' that may not be resolved, as the spirit of true religion works to prove.

It is a paradox that most of the great mystics, always intolerant of ecclesiastical authority and therefore frequently criticized by the Church, have belonged to the Roman faith, which inclines to discourage direct spiritual experience. The 'spirits must be tried to see whether they are of God,' and the visionary is looked upon with a doubt peculiarly unacceptable to one who is certain of nothing if not of the reality and glory of his experience. It remained for the Reformed Church, led in this matter by Luther, but not usually associated greatly with either saints or mystics, to encourage and trust direct personal experience, frowning on the intermediaries insisted upon by the Roman Church. Here the Reformed attitude is in harmony with New Testament teaching: the Gospels may be searched through and through in vain for any evidence that Jesus would refuse to reveal Himself except through the medium of one particular sect. In his last chapter, 'Mysticism and Religious Thought,' Prof. Hughes considers the intolerance of the mystics to religious authority as due to their high spiritual conception of the Church. They find the same difficulty as St. Paul: direct experience of spiritual truth is sometimes apt to result in a certain intolerance with those who still wander in mazes of falsehood, destroying the spirit with the letter. As the writer of the Letter to the Hebrews knew, this particular type of religious experience is 'strong meat'; those who are dull of hearing are only ready for milk, because they are babes in understanding. The mystic's perplexity in the world is similar to the problem confronting Lazarus in Browning's poem, *The Strange Experience of Karshish*: the whole of life, after the mystic experience, being so completely changed that it is almost impossible to see with the eyes of other men, nor can other men understand or even begin to appreciate the mystic's point of view:

> 'Whence has this man the balm that brightens all?
> This grown man eyes the world now like a child.'

This, of course, is common in most cases of conversion also, since conversion in itself inevitably includes some kind of mystic experience.

There is a valuable passage on p. 375 describing the processes of introversion and extraversion in the mystic:

> '. . . we may say that the mystic deliberately practices introversion in order that it may make him an extravert in the best sense of the word. . . . He seeks to find himself in order to lose himself again in God, but in this "losing his life in God" he finds himself again at a higher and nobler level of being.'

But he can only 'find himself' through profound and prolonged search in the 'sanctuary of his own soul.' Actually this form of introversion, often thoughtlessly condemned as unnecessary introspection, is an essential process in psychic life, without which there can be no development. The key to the secret of living is hidden in the soul, it has no external hiding-place, and it must be patiently, and often painfully, sought.

In the chapters on 'Abnormal Psychology and Mysticism,' 'Psychoanalysis and Mysticism' and 'The Psychology of Mystical Experience' Prof. Hughes examines the charges of eroticism and sexuality brought against mysticism by certain psychologists. His complete refutation of these theories is gratifying, and will prove of immense value to many who are not yet wholly clear on these controversial and difficult points, yet find themselves compelled in their work to try to help to clarify the problems for others. Prof. Hughes's arguments, convincing, lucid, and admirably reasoned, leave no room for further counter-arguments, because there is no aspect of the question he has not faced fully. In these matters a little knowledge is disastrous, and this valuable book will greatly increase and enrich knowledge.

DALLAS KENMARE.

AS TWO AMERICANS SEE ENGLISH THEOLOGY *

For an American to write about English theology is strange enough. For an American to review that American's book in an English publication is even more unusual.

Two years ago, in his *Realistic Theology,* Professor Walter Horton announced the demise of liberalism in all its forms. Realism was to take its place; and that realism was of a conservative sort. Professor Horton underestimated the enduring strength of liberalism, and in this book on English theology he gives much space to the English liberals. He admits that although liberal systems of theology perish, the liberal spirit persists. Indeed, 'without the liberal spirit, any system of religious teaching is in danger of ossifying, and hanging like a millstone about the neck of its adherents' (p. ix). Professor Horton traces out the various movements in English theology for the American mind, and he then predicts that American theology will follow the lead of the English 'central trend,' exemplified by Archbishop Temple.

* *Contemporary English Theology.* By Walter Marshall Horton. (Harper's. $2.00. 1936.)

It is Professor Horton's belief, substantiated by a good deal of evidence, that the intellectual leadership of Christianity has passed *from* Germany to England. American thought, therefore, should look to England for its leadership. What Horton fails to point out is that the leaders of empirical theology in America may have something which both English and German theologians might use. Horton expects American Protestantism to be influenced by the 'central trend' in English thought. He says:

> 'I do not expect American Protestantism to go over to Rome, nor to submit to Episcopal reordination; I do expect it to become more Catholic-minded' (p. xix).

Chapter One is a survey of the field. Horton divides English theology into three 'traditions,' (1) catholic, (2) protestant, (3) liberal. The Modern Churchman's Union defies classification, but is mentioned under the protestant and liberal traditions. One may disagree over the classifications and one may not accept the choices of examples in each chapter; but, as usual, Horton summarizes his men well.

Chapter Two deals with pre-War and post-War tendencies. The example of the first is R. J. Campbell, while Studdert-Kennedy illustrates the theological consequences of the War. This carries us to the position of liberalism, represented by L. P. Jacks, Dean Inge, and Professor F. R. Tennant. Concerning the future of liberalism, Horton mentions the work of Streeter, Raven, and Macmurray. The problems of communism and Christianity and of Church and State will be the central issues of the liberalism of the future. Liberalism will depart from the immanentistic idealism of Campbell, but it will retain enough of it to balance the unique and transcendent elements of the Christian faith which are returning.

Chapter Four offers summaries of *Essays, Catholic and Critical* and of John Oman's position, contrasting the catholic and protestant traditions. While the Anglo-Catholics have had no outstanding leader since Bishop Gore, there have been numerous collective undertakings.

> 'On the practical side, Anglo-Catholicism has distinguished itself not only by an interest in traditional forms of worship, but also by an ardent and effective ministry to the disinherited classes in society, and large contributions in the field of applied Christian ethics' (p. 107).

John Oman's greatest contribution is the concept of persuasive grace.

> 'Grace is not "overriding omnipotence guided by omniscience," nor is it "a sort of love philtre," which can be impersonally administered in the sacraments; it is "a gracious personal relationship" between God and the human soul, whereby God persuades us to choose our own true good. Grace in this sense is the common basis of real religion and real ethics; we "accept God's will as, by insight, we discover it to be our own"' (p. 132).
>
> 'It is his (Oman's) great distinction to have effectually revived the Augustinian and Calvinistic theology by making one major alteration in its teaching—the substitution of *persuasive* grace for *irresistible* grace' (p. 135).

The 'central trend' party, if there really be such, is a conservative liberal party. On its left wing would be Dean Matthews. Nearer the centre

would be such men as Bishop Headlam and Canon Quick. The best example of all is Archbishop Temple. Temple is a 'dialectical realist,' a term used

> 'to designate a philosophy which resembles the "dialectical materialism" of Karl Marx in its recognition of the secondary place of mind within the cosmic process, but which attributes to mind and its ideals a freedom and a metaphysical significance which Marx denies them' (p. 151).

Horton follows *Nature, Man and God* closely in presenting Temple's position, with occasional references to *Christ the Truth*.

The results of this study are applied to specifically American problems. All English thinkers have repudiated the Romantic idealism of pre-War days. Taking four representative thinkers, A. E. Taylor, John Oman, Dean Inge, and Archbishop Temple, we may say:

> 'Matter and evil, unreal to the idealists, are very real to these contemporary thinkers, and the illusion of automatic progress has been thoroughly dispelled from their minds. Instead of an immanent God whose nature is expressed in the general world-process and in secular culture, all . . . of them look to a genuinely supernatural and transcendent God, uniquely revealed in Christ and the Church. . . . They are likewise unanimous in their belief in the relative and partial validity of a natural theology or a philosophy of religion built up by the inductive method upon the basis of natural science, moral and aesthetic values, and religious experience. . . . Divine revelation and human reason, divine grace and human effort are not for them contradictory principles, but correlative principles' (p. 169).

It is Horton's opinion that such thinking as this must pervade American theology. There must be co-operation between English and American theologians. He writes:

> 'It is because England stands out to-day . . . as one place where "ideas" are free and active, and men revere truth and duty as the voice of God . . . , that I hope we shall seek the new grounding we need for our faith, in this country, in harmony and co-operation with the leading figures in contemporary English theology' (p. 175).

This little book is an admirable summary and introduction. One cannot but agree with most of Horton's comments. He has led American readers to a new appreciation of the movements of religious thought in England. It is certain that the interchange of ideas will do much to improve the theologies of both countries; and if these theologies are to strike fertile soil in the social minds of these countries there must be great and immediate improvement. At the present time, American Protestantism is far to the left of England's 'central trend'; and it is questionable whether the new theological leadership will be found in the English 'central trend,' or in America's 'naturalistic theism,' as represented by Wieman, Calhoun, and Charles Hartshorne. But whether or not we accept Horton's conclusions, we in America are indebted to him for having brought us closer to English modes of thinking.

RANDOLPH CRUMP MILLER.

Church Divinity School of the Pacific,
Berkeley, California, U.S.A.

THE CHRISTIAN ANSWER TO THE PROBLEM OF EVIL *

This small book is a reproduction of the series of wireless talks broadcast by the author a year ago. He faces the question bravely and boldly, insisting that evil is not fact and neither an illusion, nor an essential blot on God's painting of the universe: nor will he adopt the dualistic standpoint. Euclid, I remember, speaks of problems as things to be done, as opposed to theorems to be proved; so for our author evil is not a conundrum for the intellect but a task for the will: it is to be solved in the experience of life. If it were not for the vast organized evil of men's selfishness, the problem would dwindle to relatively trifling proportions. But in any case, if this is the 'best possible' world, it is not so made as to be the most pleasant or most comfortable. An evolutionary world cannot be a safe place for the lazy. God is not responsible for moral evil, but he took the risk of it happening through the limited free-will of man: and only through the existence of moral evil — war, slavery, etc., can moral advancement occur. In the talk on the Christian, as different from the general theistic, answer, he speaks as one devoted to the traditional evangelical scheme of thought, part, at least, of which will fail to satisfy the modernist: yet it is true that the story of Jesus, though giving us no theory of pain, does help us to bear it; and he is right when he says, 'You have to choose between complete irrationality at the very heart of things, and this triumph of the love which moves the stars.' This little book will be helpful, specially to the younger who have begun to puzzle over the meaning of evil. Other considerations might be well mentioned, such as the self-limitation of evil, on the analogy of heat and cold — an absolute zero for cold, and no limit to the intensity of heat. But these lectures are on the religious rather than the philosophical tack. D.W.

RELIGION IN THE UNIVERSITIES †

This book should prove useful to any young person seriously desiring to come to terms with traditional Christianity. The author, who is General Secretary of the World's Student Christian Federation, has a reputation for 'Barthianism' and personal charm. The charm is here all right in the style, which, apart from an occasional Americanism, is highly creditable in a foreigner, but we have been spared some of the louder claps of the Barthian thunder. The book should prove a useful bridge between the more liberal theology of the English S.C.M. and the more authoritarian and irrational doctrines of some of its European counterparts. Of special interest are Chapters VI and VII dealing with the task of the Christian community in facing the 'Christian' West. The author shows himself no blind optimist with regard to the prospects of Christianity. 'For the first time whole countries . . . do not even pay it lip service,' while in its stead (p. 103) 'several great political movements believe that they alone can save Europe and are willing to ruin Europe in order to prove it.'

Against this the Church cannot create a new society, but it can 'create the creators of a new society.' Dr. 't Hooft devotes the remaining chapters to an outline of how this should be done, with special regard to university life. H. P. KINGDON.

* *The Christian Answer to the Problem of Evil.* By I. S. Whale, President of Cheshunt College, Cambridge. (Student Christian Movement Press. 2/6 net, or in paper cover.)

† *None Other Gods.* By Visser 't Hooft. (S.C.M. Press. 5/-.)

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of *The Modern Churchman*

THE PROBLEM OF THE CHALICE.

SIR,

Mention of intincture in West Africa prompts me to send you a few comments concerning what we call intinction in the United States. Here most of us would accept the principle, but no one method of administering commends itself as entirely satisfactory. Hence the practice is still unauthorized.

(1) In some parishes the intincted wafer is placed between the lips or on the tongue. If the priest accidentally allows his fingers to come in contact with a communicant's saliva, the sanitary purpose is defeated.

(2) In some parishes the intincted wafer is placed in the hands. The wine cannot be sufficiently absorbed not to moisten the communicant's palm.

(3) In some parishes two cups are administered simultaneously. In his right hand the minister holds the cup, from which persons may receive in the traditional way, while in his left hand is held a small chalice, into which others may dip their wafers. Some of the clergy find this method most satisfactory, while others hesitate to use it because it restricts their freedom to use a purificator and to meet emergencies that may arise.

(4) In some parishes communicants are simply told to dip their wafers into the common cup, if they prefer to receive by intinction. Where this satisfies, it may afford a reasonable compromise; but this method invites its own type of accidents.

Administration in one kind only is preferred by many for whom Catholic theology is congenial, but the Holy Communion in both kinds is still wanted by the majority of the members of our part of the Anglican Communion.

JOHN FOSTER SAVIDGE.

Church of the Holy Communion,
Norwood, N.J.
January 7th, 1938.

[The Hussite Christians (Calixtines or Utraquists) with the chalice embroidered on their banners fought a sanguinary war in the fifteenth century in order to secure the restoration of the Cup to the laity. The right of the laity to the Cup has thenceforth been an essential principle and practice in the Reformed Churches. This is now attacked, not on doctrinal grounds, but on those of physical well-being. Are the dangers to physical health arising from the reception of the Cup by the laity such that any Christian man or woman should stand in fear of them? Mr. Bernard Shaw, in answer to the question, 'Has the modern man lost faith?' answered 'No; but he has transferred it from the clergy to the doctors.' But how far is the medical objection to the present administration of the Cup valid? Does the best medical opinion support it? We were present when this question was raised in a Colonial Synod. The presiding Bishop said, 'This is a matter primarily for the doctors. I have

therefore asked two distinguished medical men to address the Synod.' These two doctors affirmed that the dangers of infection or contagion arising from the administration of the Cup were negligible. The arguments used were threefold: (1) That the clergyman celebrating consumes not only the wine left in the Cup after all have been communicated, but in many cases consumes also the Ablutions or the rinsings of the Cup, and yet that the clergy are among the most long-lived and healthy of the population. (2) That in medical practice they had come across no case where infectious or contagious disease had been attributed to, or could be traced back to, partaking of the Cup. (3) That the dangers to public health of attending any kind of public assembly or travelling in any kind of public conveyance would seem to be very much greater than any danger arising from the reception of the Cup. They added that a sense of fear would probably render the individual more liable to catch a complaint than the absence of it, and therefore it was not advisable that apprehensions of this kind should be created in the minds of nervous persons. The proceedings then closed.

It suffices for the clergy of the Reformed Churches that the Cup is delivered into the hands of each communicant, and the communicant is free to decide whether he will or will not partake of it. The same freedom is exercised in the use of the Loving Cup on social occasions.—ED., M.C.]

WHAT IS RELIGIOUS BELIEF?

SIR,

In view of the interest of this question, you will perhaps allow me to carry its discussion a little further.

In the concluding sentence of his letter in your current issue, Mr. Hume-Rothery distinguishes himself from those who are convinced that their view of reality *is proved to be true*. I should wish to do the same, if by this is meant that any such view can be 'proved to be true' in the sense that mathematical demonstrations, for example, are proved. Our view of life and of the world should, I think, be based on grounds of normal knowledge and understanding, and these grounds should be regarded with complete rationality. So far we may hope for general agreement. But they must also be regarded with all the insight to which we can attain. And as insight is necessarily a personal matter, our views of life and of the world must also be personal and will differ. I don't think, however, that it follows that our religious (any more than our artistic) insights and appreciations are not therefore to be trusted. It cannot be *proved*, in any Euclidean sense, that Shakespeare, Dickens or Jane Austen were great writers; but this does not dismay those of us who on the evidence of their works have come to that conclusion, or interfere in the least with our pleasure and profit in reading them. Charles Lamb (a genius in his own line) confessed, I think, that music meant no more to him than the noise of a stick being run along the area railings. This, however, does not affect my knowledge that it means more to me. And our religious insights are not (any more than our artistic) to be distrusted simply because, unlike mathematics, they are not 'convincing to all reasonable people' (to quote from your correspondent's previous letter), or even experienced always by ourselves; so that we may sometimes have to give our favourite picture a miss, and the Psalmist must on occasion say 'My God, why hast thou forsaken me?'—though not, it should be noted, 'There *is* no God.' These

differences in degrees of insight as between one person and another, and temporary losses of insight in ourselves, are the price we pay for the privilege of having any capacity at all of understanding and appreciating such high matters. A penny whistle may be less liable to get out of order than a violin, but it is less capable of yielding valuable results.

Your correspondent ends by saying that 'those are not to be rejected who are willing to adventure their lives on a basis which appeals to their highest instincts, although they realise that it may prove to be an illusion.' I am far from wishing to contest the view expressed in the first part of this quotation. But in the second part I feel that a negative view is expressed rather too positively. It seems to say in effect, 'although they realise *that there can be no certainty in the matter.*' Such a statement could be justified only if it were held that our 'highest instincts' in such matters are not to be trusted—a view which, for the reasons given, I feel no obligation to accept.

Like St. James, who is quoted in this connection, I think that our faith should be shown by adventuring our lives upon it: but, like him, I think also that our faith can be a faith and not a dubiety.

ARTHUR FLOYD.

Upavon, Pioneer Avenue,
Combe Down, Bath.
January 25th, 1938.

CORRECTION.

In January *M.C.*, p. 584, line 5 read *mental* for *merited* in Mr. Hume Rothery's letter.—ED., *M.C.*

THE VIRGIN BIRTH.

SIR,

Under the above title a letter appeared in the January issue of the *Modern Churchman* in which the writer refers to St. Matthew i, 16, and St. Luke i, 35, 36, and says: 'From these passages it seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that . . . the evangelists who record the story both regarded it as a proof that Jesus Christ was the Son of God, and told it with that express object.'

In this connexion the following extracts from a book by the Rev. Dr. Thorburn, entitled 'The Virgin Birth,' may be read with interest and may modify the opinion expressed by the writer of the letter. Dr. Thorburn points out that there are variants of the text in St. Matthew i in ancient manuscripts. In the Vatican MS. of Tatian's Diatessaron in an Arabic version this text is rendered: 'Jacob begat Joseph the husband of Mary, who of her begat Jesus the Messiah.' In the Syriac Palimpsest MS. of the four gospels discovered on Mt. Sinai 1892, the passage is rendered: 'Joseph to whom was betrothed Mary the Virgin, begat Jesus, who is called the Messiah.' In the Curetonian Syriac MS. the passage is practically the same: 'Joseph to whom was betrothed Mary the Virgin, who begat Jesus.'

Dr. Thorburn adds that belief in the Virgin Birth is found in Ignatius, Aristides, and Justin Martyr (first half of the second century), but that with these exceptions none of the earliest writers outside the N.T. mention it directly. It was certainly accepted during the second half of the second century, he adds.

There remains the passage in St. Luke i, 35, 36. Professor Harnack has suggested that these two verses may be later interpolations, not part of the original text. Certainly the record of the vision of the Angel and the prediction to Mary loses nothing in continuity and beauty if this was so. And it seems more in accord with what we might expect that the startled maiden should not question the visitor who made this promise to her. She was already betrothed and there was no reason why she should be puzzled as to how the prospect held out to her might be fulfilled in course of time.

We may be thankful that the published opinion of the members of the commission appointed by the archbishops makes it clear that belief in the Incarnation does not necessarily involve belief in the Virgin Birth, and that this great belief ought not to be based on the *manner* in which 'the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us.' The revelation of God with us in Christ rests on a far broader and deeper foundation. Dr. Gore wrote in his work *Belief in God* (p. 274): 'Certainly nothing concerning the birth of Christ was part of the assurance on the basis of which faith in Jesus was proclaimed. I may add that it ought not to this day to form part of the basis of this claim.' This statement is the more significant because Dr. Gore added that his own opinion was that the miraculous event was a fact.

Whether the Virgin Birth was a fact or not can neither be proved nor disproved, but we may surely feel convinced that, if so great a revelation depended on this miracle, we should have found some definite reference to it in the Acts and Epistles, if not in the records of Christ's teaching. Therefore let each one accept the view that seems to him most likely to be true, or be contented to suspend judgment and cease to argue. Controversy retards rather than stimulates worship and inspiration. If we are able to say with St. Paul that 'the light of the knowledge of the glory of God has shone upon us in the face of Jesus Christ' that is not due to our belief as to the *manner* of His birth, but because we have studied the character of Our Lord and have found it 'full of grace and truth.'

HELEN ALEX. DALLAS.

Belle Vue Hotel,
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January 27th, 1938.

THE VIRGIN BIRTH IN ST. MATTHEW'S GOSPEL.

SIR,

It seems to me clear that the first evangelist really teaches that God committed adultery (according to Jewish law) by becoming the physical father of Jesus when Mary was espoused to Joseph. His well-known love of finding prophecies fulfilled made the first evangelist jump at the mistranslation of *almah*, young woman, by *parthenos*, virgin, in the Septuagint version of Is. vii, 14, as a marvel miraculously revealed to the prophet. Early Christians probably mistakenly fancied that it added to the prestige of Jesus to be miraculously born as a *divus* or demigod, although of course as Mr. Hitchcock well points out, in that case He would be neither perfect God nor perfect man.

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